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TERMINAL PLACEMENTS OF CHILDREN AND
PERMANENT TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS: THE NEW YORK PERMANENT
NEGLECT STATUTE
HnA D. GOPDON*
The rights of a parent in his child' can be restricted in many
kinds of judicial proceedings. A divorce order, for example, can place
custody of a child in one spouse and grant the other spouse only a
limited right to see the child.2 In a neglect proceeding a court can
temporarily remove custody from a parent and vest it in an authorized
social agency pending reapplication of the parent.3 The restriction of
parental rights need not be limited or temporary; it is possible for a
* B.A., Harvard University; M.B.A., Columbia University; J.D., Columbia University.
I Parental rights today
generally include: control, custody, natural guardianship, determination of living
standards, of religion, of education, earnings, inheritance, and the right to notice
and appearance at judicial proceedings involving their children.... Coupled with
rights are parental responsibilities for care, support, guidance, and supervision.
U.S. DPI"T OF HEALTH, EnuCATION, & WELFARE, LE;sLATivE GuiEs FOR THE TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND REPONSMLrrE AND THE ADOPTION OF CILDREN 1 (Children's
Bureau Pub: No. 594-1961, (1961) [hereinafter LEGISLATIV Gums].
The legal basis of these fundamental rights remains unclear despite considerable
analysis. One line of thought suggests that parental rights gained recognition as property
rights with the child being likened to a chattel. Fritts v. Krugh, 854 Mich. 97, 92 N.W.2d
604 (1958); A. JAcOBs & J. GOEBEL, DoMErxc RELATIONS 881 (4th ed. 1961); Sayre, Awarding
Custody of Children, 9 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 672, 675 (1942). Other authorities contend that the
parent has inherent natural rights in his child, which the Constitution protects. Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); People
ex tel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 203 NY. 539, 104 N.E.2d 895 (1952); Simpson, The Unfit
Parent: Conditions Under Which a Child May be Adopted Without the Consent of His
Parents, 39 U. DEr. L.J. 347, 353 (1962) [hereinafter The Unfit Parent]. A third theory
considers the parent's rights to derive from a trust reposed in him by the State acting as
parens patriae. In re Jacques, 48 N.J. Super. 523, 138 A.2d 581 (1958); Purinton v. Jamrock,
195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907); Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wins. 103, 24 Eng.
Rep. 659 (Ch. 1725). In contrast with the first two theories, the "trust" theory rarely stands
by itself. Rather, it usually appears in conjunction with one of the other two to qualify
the nature of the parental rights which other wise might appear to be absolute. County
of McLean v. Humphreys, 104 Ill. 278 (1882). The trust theory also serves to justify the
long standing equitable power of the state to intervene in the parent-child relationship
to protect a child in need of care. 3 J. STORY, CoMIEnTrrMu.S ON EquITY JURISDICTION,
§§ 1743-1749 (14th ed. 1918); State ex tel. Miller v. Bryant, 94 Neb. 754, 144 N.W. 804
(1913).
As against the rights and interests of the child and of society in the child, parental
rights have been steadily weakened in the twentieth century. See, e.g., Adoption of a
Minor, 343 Mass. 292, 178 N.E.2d 264 (1961); R. PouN, SPIrr oF TIm COMMON LAW 189
(1921).
2 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-24 (1959); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 240 (Mc-
Kinney 1964).
3 E.g., N.Y. FAx. Or. Acr art. 10 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
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parent to be divested of all his rights in his child and for this to be
given permanent effect. Both a divorce4 and a neglect5 proceeding
permit such a result, for example. Some proceedings are designed
specifically for the permanent termination of all parental rights. 6
While some statutes provide proceedings for voluntary termination of
all rights,7 mPst of the statutes speak only to the issue of involuntary
termination.8 Not unexpectedly, proceedings for the permanent termi-
nation of parental rights raise difficult issues. Courts must choose be-
tween the rights of the parent and his interest in meeting the challenges
and responsibilities of parenthood on the one hand, and the rights of
the child (and of society in the child), to a sound and constructive
family life and a chance for successful personality development on the
other hand.9
One of the situations in which a parent's rights are sometimes
permanently terminated arises when a child is placed in foster care,
either voluntarily or by court order. In many instances the parent,
after maintaining contact for a while, gradually loses interest. Soon,
contact between parent and child is reduced to no more than an occa-
sional visit or gift. Although he is unwilling or unable to reassume
custody himself, the parent frequently will not consent to the child's
adoption by someone else. Unless the natural parent's rights are ter-
minated the child is likely to grow up without having had any
permanent parents and the love and security that they can supply.
Three types of statutes are appropriate in this situation. Under the
first the requirement that the natural parent must consent to the
4 See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1964).
5 E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.40 (1957) as amended (Supp. 1970).
6 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 232 (West Supp. 1970); N.Y. FAm. Cr. Acr § 614 (McKinney
1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.40 (1957).
7 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1104 (Supp. 1968); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48A0 (West
1957) as amended (Supp. 1970).
8 This omission of statutory proceedings for voluntary termination has been criticized
for the reasons, among others, that without the guidance of a statute and a judicial
determination the natural parent will be less likely to understand the implications of
termination and, secondly, the clarity and finality of a judicial termination will be absent.
Paulsen, The New York Family Court Act, 12 BUFFALO L. REv. 420, 428 (1963); LEGIsIA-
FIVE GuiDEs, supra note 1, at 9-13.
9 See, e.g., In re Maxwell, 117 Cal. App. 2d 156, 255 P.2d 87 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954), in
which a child was declared free from the control and custody of her natural mother, from
whom she had been taken earlier because of the mother's excessive drinking, despite the
facts that the mother had made a "praiseworthy and apparently successful effort to re-
habilitate herself" and that the court had "no doubt of her present sincere desire" to
care for the child. Id. at 166, 255 P.2d at 94.
For an instance where parental rights were not terminated despite the manifest
inability of the natural mother to discharge her parental responsibilities, see In re Clear,
58 Misc. 2d 699, 296 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1969), rev'd per curiam sub nom.
In re Klug, 32 App. Div. 2d 915, 302 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Ist Dep't 1969), discussed p. 240 infra.
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adoption of his child is dispensed with when the consent is withheld
contrary to the best interests of the child.10 The second kind provides
that if the natural parent has given the child so little attention or care
that the child can be considered "abandoned," then the requirement
of his consent to the adoption of his child can be dispensed with 1 or,
in some cases, his rights can be permanently terminated in a special
proceeding.'2 The third type of statute resembles the second in pro-
viding that deficient parental care or attention can justify the permanent
termination of parental rights. It differs from most of the statutes
of the second type by requiring that the forfeiture of rights take place
in a proceeding separate from the adoption proceeding,13 and it differs
from all of the statutes of the second type by omitting the word
"abandon." The New York permanent neglect statute is of the third
type.114 Although all three types of statutes frequently contain language
similar to that in statutes for temporary removals of custody,'5 it should
be remembered that they all provide for the more severe determination
of the permanent termination of all parental rights.' 6
This article will examine the problem of these children who will
neither be taken back into the homes of their natural parents nor
legally freed by their parents for placement in an adoptive home, who
are in limbo between the security and warmth that either home might
be expected to offer. It will also examine the usefulness of the three
statutory schemes for resolving this problem. First, the predicament of
the children will be looked at more closely. Next an analysis of the
so-called best interests and abandonment types of provisions will be
presented. Against this background, the third section will discuss in
detail the New York permanent neglect statute. The fourth section will
analyze a recent judicial attempt to circumvent New York's permanent
neglect statute. Placement of foster care children in permanent homes,
however, depends on more than just a reasonably drafted statute.
10 See Auz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-104 (Supp. 1970); Mv. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 74 (1957)
as amended (Supp. 1970).
11E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 3 (1958); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 435 (1958).
12E.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 232-233 (West Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1.2 (1963)
as amended (Supp. 1970).
13 At least one abandonment statute also makes such a requirement. See DEL.. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 1103 (Supp. 1968).
14 N.Y. FAm. Cr. Acr. §§ 611-634 (McKinney 1963) as amended (Supp. 1969).
15 The word "neglect," for example, frequently appears in the several kinds of statutes
for permanent termination as well as those for temporary removal of custody.
10 A helpful analysis of the differences between proceedings for the temporary removal
of custody and for the permanent termination of all rights appears in Note, Legislative
and Judicial Recognition of the Distinction Between Custody and Termination Orders in
Child Neglect Cases, 7 J. FAm. L. 66 (1967).
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Several of the empirical conditions that affect adoptive placements will
be discussed in the fifth part. The final portion of this article will
present a brief summary and propose several ways to improve the New
York statute so as to achieve a more equitable balance of the interests
of the child and his natural parent.
I. DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
The number of children who are without parents because their
natural parents will neither take them back into their homes nor give
them up so that they may be adopted received its first notoriety in 1955
with the publication of a study of the children under the care of volun-
tary child-care agencies in New York City.' 7 It was found that of the
4,021 children studied, adoption would have been a sound plan for 778
(19.2 percent), 8 and that of these 773 children 632 (82 percent) were not
legally available for adoption. 9 One hundred fifty-seven children who
were living with foster parents were found to be adoptable but for the
fact that they were not legally available.20 The primary reason for this
unavailability was the difficulty in obtaining parental consent: in 500
cases (over 79 percent of the 632 children not legally available for adop-
tion and over 12 percent of all the children studied) the parents were
unwilling or unable to take the responsibility of supplying their con-
sent, they had made no contact with their children for one year or more,
or their whereabouts was unknown for one year or more.2
1
Another study found that the parents of about half of the 268,000
children in foster caret2 in the United States in the late 1950's had no
definite plans to relinquish the child or to return him to his home.23 In
more than half of the 268,000 cases the parents maintained no more
than a superficial contact with their children.24 In 1968 there were
17 WELFARE & HEALTH COUNCIL OF Naw YORK Crr, CHILDRN DEPRIV OF ADOPTION
(1955) [hereinafter CHILDREN DEPPRIvED OF ADOPnON].
18 Id. at 6-7.
19 d. at 10.
20d. at 13.
21 There were 300 instances of unwillingness or inability to take responsibility, 108
instances of lack of contact for one year or more, and 92 cases of lack of knowledge of the
parents' whereabouts. Additional reasons for the legal unavailability of these children
included the physical or mental illness of the parents (14 and 77 instances, respectively)
and the refusal of the agency to accept the surrender of the child because there were no
available adoption resources (41 instances). Id. at 11-12.
22 By "foster care" is meant care in institutions, foster family homes, and pre-adoptive
homes.
23 MAAs & ENGLER, CHILDREN IN NEED OF PARENTs 380 (1959) [hereinafter MA.s &
ENGLER].
241Id. 351.
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about 316,000 children in foster care in the United States.2s Al-
though figures are not available for the number of children for whom
adoption would be a sound plan 26 and the number who would be adopt-
able but for their lack of legal availability, if the figure from the New
York study is used (12 percent)27 there would have been about 38,000
children who were in a legal limbo instead of a permanent home. To
put this figure in perspective it can be noted that in the United States in
1968 there were about 166,000 adoptions, of which 86,300 were by
persons not related to the adopted children.2
The impersonal quality of numbers should not obscure the pos-
sible unhappiness and harm that can befall a child who is deserted in
foster care. That successful personality development depends in large
part on a child's relationship with his parents (and especially his mother)
is one of the foundations of modern personality theory.29 In particular,
a warm and intimate relationship between a child and his mother in
his very early years has been held essential to the development of a
sense of trust and reciprocity for the rest of the person's life"0 and to
mental health generally.31 Yet most of the children in foster care in
most of the communities examined in one study had had more than
one placement and usually had had two or three. 2 Even if they are
placed only once, all too often children in foster care do not receive the
attention and warmth that they want and need. 3 The inability of
the child in foster care to satisfy his emotional requirements can be
doubly injurious, because in contrast with the typical adopted child
25 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, CHILD WELFARE STATISTICS 29
(1968) [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE STAT'STICS (1968)]. 240,000 of the 316,000 children were
in foster family care, and 75,000 were in institutions. Id.
26 Some children in foster care are not suited for adoption. There are children who
are so emotionally disturbed that they cannot fit into an adoptive family, children who
are still too attached to their natural parent(s) to accept adoptive parents, and so on. What
may help these children most is sound care in a good institution. CHILD WEarRE
LEAGUE OF AIERICA, CHILDREN IN NEED OF PARENTS 15 (1960) [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE
LEAGUE OF AmEmCA].
27 This figure is not necessarily correct, because it derives from the study of a com-
munity whose adoption laws and customs may not be representative of those of the entire
nation.
28 U.S. DEP'r or HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, ADOPTIONS iN 1968 1 (1968)
[hereinafter ADOPTIONS IN 1968].
29 S. FREUD, INTRODUCroRY LEcTuRES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 255-284 (2d ed. J. Riviere trans.
1961); S. FRauD, Tim Eoo AND THE ID 18-29 (. Riviere trans. 1962); E. ERIKSON, CHILD-
HOOD AND Sociury (2d ed. 1963); but see BErrrLHEI,, CHILDREN OF THE DREAm (1969).
30 E. ERIESON, CHILDHOOD AND Socairy 72-80, 247-51 (2d ed. 1963).
31 J. BowLBY, ArrAaciErNr AND Loss (1969).
32 MAAS & .ENCLER,- supra note 28, at 350.
33 Poller, Problems Involving Family and Child, 66 CoLum. L. REV. 305, 310 (1966)
[hereinafter Family and Child].
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he is more likely to suffer from some kind of psychological distur-
bance.34 Although the child in long-term placement who is psycho-
logically disturbed usually was disturbed when he entered placement,3
it has been found that foster care is likely to aggravate the child's
problems."0 This will only make the child less adoptable (assuming
eventual consent to adoption by the parent) as well as less attractive
to an already ambivalent natural parent.87 Finally, children old enough
to be aware of the fact that they are committed indefinitely to foster
care must try to cope with the disquieting knowledge that their parents
are not willing to take them home.
The child and the prospective adoptive parents, if any, are not the
only ones affected by the natural parents' refusal to consent to adop-
tion. Substantial funds are required to care for the children who are
abandoned in effect by their parents. In 1967, for example, foster care
payments of public funds by state and local public welfare agencies
amounted to nearly $313.5 million.38 Public funds spent on personnel
to administer agencies for child welfare services (including services
besides foster care such as day care) were an additional $150 million.39
To these public funds were probably added about $300 million of
private contributions to make a total of $763 million.40 Of course not
all this money was spent to care for children who could have been
adopted but for the unwillingness of their parents to consent. On the
basis of the 12 percent figure from the New York study it might be said
that failing to place these children in adoptive homes carries a financial
cost of approximately $90 million per year.
II. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDER
BEST INTERESTS AND ABANDONMENT STATUTES
Several jurisdictions have statutes which provide that when a
parent withholds his consent to the adoption of his child contrary to
the best interests of his child, the customary requirement of parental
consent is suspended.41 These statutes would seem to obviate the prob-
34 MAAs & ENGLER3 54.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37Id.
38 CHILD WELFARE STATIsTIcS (1968), supra note 25, at 40-41. $5.873 million wcre sup-
plied by the federal government, $177.825 million by state governments, and $10.196
million by local sources. Id.
39 Id. at 88.
40 The ratio of public to private contributions of funds for 1965 was about 3:2. Reid,
America's Forgotten Children, PARENTS' MAGAZINE, Feb. 1966, at 40. It is assumed that the
ratio remained approximately the same in 1967.
41 ARiz. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 8-106 (Supp. 1970) "when ... the interests of the child will
[Vol. 46:215
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lem of the child's lack of legal availability. Indeed, they would seem
to accomplish much more. Read literally, the statutes would preclude
objection by a parent to the removal of his child even from his regular
and permanent home so long as the move to the new home was deemed
in the best interests of the child.42 Courts have therefore added a
statutory gloss requiring a showing that the parent has failed in his
responsibilities to his child before his consent can be deemed un-
necessary.43 The failure of parental responsibilities must amount to will-
ful desertion or neglect,44 willful abandonment,4 or conduct similarly
manifesting a clear lack of parental fitness. 46 When the dereliction is
less serious, a court may resort to the fiction that the parent's consent
is not being withheld contrary to the best interests of the child in order
to preserve the gloss while observing the statutory language.47
A child in foster care who could be adopted but for the lack of
his legal availability would seem to be a child whose parent's consent
is withheld contrary to his best interests within the meaning of these
be promoted thereby."; MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 74 (1957) as amended, (Supp. 1970) "if
...consent... withheld contrary to the best interests of the child."; VA. CODE ANN.
§ 63.1-225 (1968) "the best interests of the child will be served .. "; D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
504 (1967) "when the court finds ... that the consent or consents are withheld contrary to
the best interests of the child."
42 One author remarks that
[a]n extreme interpretation of the best interests rule could lead to a redistribution
of the entire minor population among the worthier members of the community,
a project the courts have declined to undertake.
The Unfit Parent at 855
43 Thus the tests of the rights of the parent and the best interests of the child are not
always in opposition. Before a court can turn to the question of the best interests of the
child, it must first make a finding of lack of parental fitness. "The starting point .. .
is the obvious but often overlooked principle that in the going family the parents are
entitled to the custody of their children." H. CLARK, THE LAw OF DoMF.snc RELATIONS IN
THE UNrIED STArs 591 (1968) [hereinafter CLARK]. Confusion might arise when the issues
of the fitness of the parent and the best interests of the child are determined in one
proceeding.
44 Westerlund v. Croaff, 68 Ariz. 86, 198 P.2d 842 (1948).
45 Compare Shetler v. Fink, 231 Md. 802, 190 A.2d 76 (1963) with Logan v. Coup, 238
Md. 258, 208 A.2d 694 (1965).
46 Some opinions contain language minimizing the force of this judicially implied
requirement of lack of parental fitness, but the facts in these cases usually are sufficient to
satisfy the requirement and to render the Court's remarks only dictum. See, e.g., Walker
v. Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 284, 157 A.2d 273, 275 (1960): "that the adoption would be for
the child's best interests . .. almost necessarily is a finding in itself that the withholding
of consent was legally unjustified . . ."; at the same time the court found a "strong" case
for permitting the adoption over the expressed objection of the natural parent who was
reported to be "evasive, "unstable," and "entirely selfish," and who neither saw nor
contributed to the support of his child for nearly ten years.
47 Beltran v. Heim, 248 Md. 897, 401, 236 A.2d 723, 725 (1968):
[The finding.., that the consent of the natural father had been withheld contrary
to the best interest of the child, is not supported by the record. There was evi-
dence that the natural father had neglected the child and had failed to support her,
but there was also evidence that the natural father had not abandoned the child.
1971]
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statutes and perhaps also within the meaning of the judicially imposed
gloss. Yet it's hard to find a reported case where any of these statutes
received this application.48 A partial explanation is that few jurisdic-
tions have these statutes, 49 and, with the exception of Maryland, those
that do have them seem to make little use of them. Moreover, few
proceedings are brought in general to free a foster-care child from his
parents when the parent is unwilling to consent to his adoption, what-
ever kind of statute is available. If a court acting under a best interests
statute did happen to terminate the rights of a parent who will neither
give up nor take back his child, the statutory gloss makes it unlikely
that it would do so without a finding of abandonment. Since the con-
cept of abandonment is the same for the purposes of the gloss, as in
statutes explicitly written to terminate parental rights in the case of
abandonment, 50 best interests statutes are reduced in effect to statutes
for abandonment. 51 For the purposes of this article the two types of
statutes will therefore be treated alike.
Most states have statutes providing for the termination of the
rights of a parent who has abandoned his child.52 Some of the statutes
take the form of allowing a court in an adoption proceeding to dispense
with the requirement of the consent of the natural parent if he has
abandoned his child.53 Others contemplate in theory at least a separate
and prior determination of the issue of abandonment and the termina-
tion of all parental rights if an abandonment is found.r4 The latter
48 This writer found none.
49 See note 41 supra.
GO In Logan v. Coup, 238 Md. 253, 208 A.2d 694 (1965), the court, after noting that
abandonment is one of the factors to be considered in determining whether consent is
being withheld contrary to the best interests of the child, adopted in toto the definition of
abandonment as used in its abandonment statute (Md. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 74(b)): "any
wilful and intentional conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose
to forego all parental duties and relinquishes all parental claims to the child, and to
renounce and foresake the child entirely." Id. at 258, 208 A.2d at 697.
51 This reduction arises in the situation under discussion in this article-where a
child is placed in long-term foster care. In another situation -for example, where the
child lives at home and receives no attention or care - the gloss on the best interests
statutes might reduce them in effect to statutes for the termination of parental rights
upon a showing of extreme neglect.
52 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 3 (1958); CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 232-233 (West Supp. 1970);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103 (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.011 (1969); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 4, §§ 9.1-1, 9.1-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 61-205 (1962); PA.
STAT. tit. 1, § 1.2 (1963) as amended (Supp. 1970); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-102, 36-110
(Supp. 1969); V. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 435 (1958); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.40 (1957) as
amended (Supp. 1970).
53 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 3 (1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-1, 9.1-8 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 435 (1958).
54 The California statute provides:
§ 232. Persons entitled to be declared free from parental custody and control
An action may be brought for the purpose of having any person under the
[Vol. 46:215
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statutes, frequently bearing a title such as "Termination of Parental
Rights"' a or "Freedom from Parental Custody and Control ' r5 and
usually specifying other conduct besides abandonment as grounds for
the permanent termination of parental rights, typically contain a more
elaborate definition of "abandonment."5 7 In effect, under the term
age of 21 years declared free from the custody and control of either or both of
his parents when such person comes within any of the following descriptions:
(a) Person abandoned by parents to care and custody of another; Intent; sup-
port or communication with child.(a) Who has been left without provision for his identification by his parent
or parents or by others or has been left by both of his parents or his sole parent
in the care and custody of another without any provision for his support, or
without communication from such parent or parents, for . . . a period of six
months with the intent on the part of such parent or parents to abandon such
person. Such failure to provide . . . identification, failure to provide, or failure
to communicate for .. . a period of six months . . shall be presumptive
evidence of the intent to abandon. Such person shall be deemed and called a
person abandoned by the parent or parents abandoning him. If in the opinion
of the court the evidence indicates that such parents have made only token efforts
to support or communicate with the child, the court may declare the child
abandoned by such parent or parents.
The fact that a child is in a foster care home, licensed under subdivision(A) of Section 16000 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, shall not prevent alicensed adoption agency which is planning adoption placement for the child,
from instituting, under this subdivision, an action to declare such child free from
the custody and control of his parents. When the requesting agency is a licensed
county adoption agency, the county counsel and if there is not county counsel,
the district attorney shall institute such action.
§ 22S2. 5.
The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to serve and protect
the interests and welfare of the child.
§ 233.
Any interested person may petition the superior court of the county in which
a minor person described in Section 232 resides or in which such minor person
is found or in which any of the acts constituting abandonment . . . occurred, for
an order or judgment declaring such -minor person free from the custody and
control of either or both of his parents.
CAL. CIvIL CODE ch. 4, §§ 232-233 (West Supp. 1970). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103
(Supp. 1968); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 1.2 (West 1963); Wis. STAT, ANN. § 48.40 (1957) as
amended (Supp. 1970).
Most proceedings to terminate parental rights on the ground of abandonment are
instituted as part of an adoption proceeding whether or not the statute permits a prior
determination of the abandonment issue. In re Conrich, 221 Cal. App. 2d 662, 34 Cal. Rptr.
658 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); In re Rettew, 428 Pa. 430, 239 A2d 397 (1968); In re Austin, 426
Pa. 441, 233 A.2d 526 (1967). But see In re Maxwell, 117 Cal. App. 2d 156, 255 P.2d 87 (Dist.
Ct App. 1953).
A Tennessee court has indicated that the statutory definition of abandonment applies
only in separate proceedings to terminate parental rights and that a different, more flexible
standard may be used when the issue of abandonment arises in a proceeding for adoption.
Ex parte Wolfenden, 49 Tenn. App. 1, 349 S.W2d 713 (Ct. App. 1959).
On the other hand, Delaware requires that the termination of parental rights in a
case of abandonment precede the filing of the petition for adoption. DEL. CODE ANN, tit.
12, § 908 (1953).
65 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48,40 et seq. (1957) as amended (Supp. 1970).
G0 CAL. CIvIL CODE § 232 (West Supp, 1970).
"57 Compare CAL. CIVIL CODE ch. 4, § 232 (West Supp.'1970), reprinted, at note 54 supra,
and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1101 (Supp. 1968) [" 'Abandoned' shall be interpreted as refer-
ring to any child who, for a period of one year, has not received any regular and reasonable
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"abandonment" these statutes are providing for the termination of
parental rights for gross inattentiveness 8 Although these statutes might
therefore be regarded as conceptually different from the more tradi-
tional (and strict) abandonment statutes, it is in fact appropriate to
classify the two together. In most states abandonment statutes of one
type or the other date back a number of years. 9 By including the term
"abandonment" the permanent termination statutes incorporate much
of the large judicial gloss which has built up in the respective jurisdic-
tions around the earlier abandonment statutes. 60 As a result of this
common heritage the two types of statutes are more similar in operation
than a mere reading of their terms would suggest.
By the usual case-law rule, a parent is considered to abandon his
child when by his conduct he demonstrates a settled purpose to re-
nounce his rights in and his responsibilities over 61 the child.6 2 Usually
it is said that the conduct must unequivocally and absolutely show
complete and permanent abandonment.63 Whether a specific mental
element must accompany the objective conduct is an open question.
Cases frequently state that to constitute abandonment the conduct
financial help from or any substantial visits from his parent or parents . . . and on whose
behalf no substantial contracts have been initiated by his parent or parents, provided,
however, that in the case of any illegitimate child or foundling... then 'abandoned' may
be interpreted by the court, in its discretion, as referring to a child who, for a period of six
months, has not received any regular financial help from or any substantial visits from his
parent or parents... and on whose behalf no substantial contracts have been initiated by
his parent or parents.. . ."] with ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 3 (1958) (no definition) and I. ANN.
STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967) (no definition; however conduct besides "aban-
donment" which permits a court to dispense with the requirement of parental consent to
an adoption includes, "[F]ailure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or
responsibility as to the child's welfare" and "[d]esertion of the child for more than 3
months next preceding the commencement of the Adoption proceeding." Id.
58 See the California statute reprinted in part note 54 supra and the Delaware statute,
reprinted in part note 57 supra.
59 The California statute, for example, reprinted note 54 supra, was enacted originally
in 1915 (CAL. STATS. 1915, ch. 631, § 1 at 1225) and has been amended a number of times
over the years.
60 E.g., in Cline v. Hartzler, 227 A.2d 210 (Del. 1967), the court stated that although the
Delaware permanent termination statute permitted a finding of abandonment where a
child "for a period of one year has not received any regular and reasonable financial help
from or any substantial visits from his parent," the "general law" of the State continued
to require, as before the enactment of the statute, a showing of intent to forego all pa-
rental duties and to relinquish all parental claims.
In California, too, the baggage that came with the word "abandonment" is much in
evidence. See note 78 infra.
61 Parental rights and responsibilities are discussed note 1 supra.
62 One frequently cited definition of abandonment'is "any conduct on the part of the
parent, which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties, and to relinquish all
parental claims to the child." Winans v. Luppie, 47 N.J. Eq. 302, 304, 20 A. 969, 970 (1890).
63 In re Cordy, 169 Cal. 150, 146 P. 532 (1914); In re Bistany, 239 N.Y. 19, 145 N.E. 70
(1924).
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must be intentional or willful,6 but decisions can be found to support
the proposition that abandonment can arise from merely negligent
behavior.65 Of course, the fact that the mental element can only be
inferred from overt behavior permits a court to find the requisite ele-
ment of intent in conduct which might have indicated only negli-
gence.06
Abandonment statutes can be applied to the case of a child
deserted in long term foster care to terminate the rights of a parent
and free the child for adoption. 67 However, several things prevent these
04 In re Rettew, 428 Pa. 430, 239 A.2d 397 (1968): [abandonment] "implies that the
mother intentionally and purposefully left her child on the desert of forgetfulness." Id. at
434, 239 A.2d at-. CAL. CIVIL CODE ch. 4, § 232 (West Supp. 1970), reprinted note 54 supra.
05 Emmons v. Dinelli, 235 Ind. 249, 133 N.E2d 56 (1956).
66 In re Maxwell, 117 Cal. App. 2d 156, 255 P.2d 87 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953); In re Welch,
108 Cal. App. 2d 466, 238 P.2d 1031 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952); In re Biddle, 168 Ohio St. 209,
152 N.E.2d 105 (1958).
From the child's point of view of course it makes little difference whether or not he
was abandoned deliberately.
67 In re Maxwell, 117 Cal. App. 2d 156, 255 P.2d 87 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953); In re E.,
239 A.2d 626 (Del. 1968); In re Knapp, 3 Misc. 2d 840, 156 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sur. Ct. Kings
County 1956).
Abandonment statutes find use in other contexts as well. One application arises when
a divorced parent, with custody of a child, remarries. The new spouse will frequently want
to adopt the child. If the former spouse has given the child sufficiently little attention or
love or support since the divorce, his rights in the child may be terminated. G. v. S., 238
A.2d 834 (Del. 1968); but see In re Cattalini, 72 Cal. App. 2d 662, 165 P.2d 250 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1946), for a case where termination was not ordered. Another application can occur
when a parent - frequently an unmarried mother - places a child with friends or relatives
on the vague understanding that she is to recover the child when she becomes more able
to care for him. Not unnaturally, a close relationship often develops between the child and
surrogate parents. When the natural parent requests the return of the child (or sometimes
on their own initiative) the couple caring for the child will institute a proceeding formally
to adopt him. Under certain circumstances the natural parent will be deemed to have
abandoned the child and the surrogate parents will be granted the adoption. In re Welch,
108 Cal. App. 2d 466, 238 P.2d 1031 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
5 E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.40 (1957) as amended, (Supp. 1970).
Very difficult and dramatic abandonment cases arise when a parent-again frequently
an unmarried mother - gives up a child for adoption but before the adoption changes her
mind. This is possible because the adoptive parents usually must wait out a statutory
period before they can commence an adoption proceeding. In New York this period has
been six months. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 112 (McKinney Supp. 1970). When the natural
parent changes her mind, typically she petitions for a writ of habeas corpus to recover her
child, and the adoptive parents counter with a petition for adoption. The issue becomes
whether the nature and timing of the change in intentions are sufficient to rebut a showing
of abandonment. If abandonment is not proved, then the petition for adoption will be
denied and custody ordered to revert to the natural parent irrespective of the attachment
that has developed between the child and adoptive parents. Since a year or more can pass
from the time the adoptive parents receive the child until the time the litigation has ended,
the impact of the loss of the child can be severe. Two recent cases in New York have fo-
cused attention on this kind of situation. In January, 1971, the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed a decision ordering a couple to return to his natural mother a three-year-old boy
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statutes from being ideal instruments to sever parental ties. Because
the statutes derive from a period less receptive to adoption and more
protective of the rights of parents in their children, the sizeable gloss
which they have acquired will typically contain statements to the effect
that the statute is to be strictly construed as being in derogation of the
common law.6  One writer finds in the term "abandonment" connota-
tions of property law which, he suggests, serve to reinforce the parent's
rights in his child at the expense of the child, the owned property.69
The same writer and several others consider courts far too slow in
determining that a child has been abandoned.70 Furthermore, the lan-
guage of abandonment statutes frequently is at variance with the
reality to which they are supposed to be directed. While statutes or
their gloss speak in terms of settled purpose and unequivocal conduct,
the typical parent of a child in long-term foster care will have vague
plans and an equivocal commitment.71 Even the permanent termination
they had received two weeks after his birth and whom they were in the process of adopting.
The natural mother had changed her mind because she had married and thought she could
now provide a home for her child. In the televised transfer of custody in February, 1971,
the natural mother took the child from the courtroom as he protested, "I want to go to my
Mommy." N.Y. Times, March 24, 1971, at 38, col. 1. In April, 1971, the Court of Appeals
affirmed a decision ordering a couple to return a child known as "'Baby Lenore" to her
natural mother, an unmarried woman who had placed the child with an adoption agency
four days after her birth in May, 1970, and who signed a surrender agreement ten days
later. The child was placed with the adoptive parents when she was one month old. Five
days later the natural mother changed her mind and requested that her child be returned.
Upon the refusal of the agency the mother began legal proceedings. N.Y. Times, April 8,
1971, at 37, col. 1. Since the Court of Appeals decision, the adoptive couple have appealed
and lost in the United States Supreme Court (N.Y. Times, May 6, 1971, at 24, col. 3), and
have moved with the child out of New York (N.Y. Times, May 26, 1971, at 39, col. 1). In
response to these decisions, the New York State Senate passed a bill on May 6, 1971 which
provides that thirty days after a child has been surrendered for adoption, a presumption
will arise that the adoptive parents are more fit parents for the child than the natural
parent. N.Y. Times, May 7, 1971, at 24, col. 3.
68 E.g., In re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514, 126 P. 161 (1912):
As the act of adoption is to sever absolutely the legal relation between the par-
ents and child, to destroy their reciprocal relations, and create entirely new ones
between the adopting parent and the child, the law, recognizing the natural and
sacred rights of the natural parents to their children, will permit this to be done
only with the consent of the parents, unless under exceptional conditions, which
it itself prescribes, such consent is declared unnecessary. The power of the court
in adoption proceedings to deprive a parent of his child being in derogation of
his natural right to it, and being a special power conferred by the statute, such
statute must be strictly construed....
Id. at 523-24, 126 P. at 165.
It was perhaps in response to statements like this that California added section 232.5
to its abandonment statute.
69 CLA, , supra note 43, 631.
7o Id. 634; The Unfit Parent, supra note 1, at 372 (1962); Polier, Amendments to New
York's Adoption Law, The "Permanently Neglected" Child, 38 CsUsL WELFARE 1, 2 (July
1959) [hereinafter The "Permanently Neglected" Child].
71 See, e.g., In re Jones, 59 Misc. 2d 69, 297 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1969);
In re Williams, 133 Cal. App. 2d 515, 284 P.2d 510 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
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type of abandonment statute with its more explicit definition of aban-
donment does not escape this problem. The Delaware statute,72 for
example, which makes no requirement at all as to the mental element
of the parent, was construed in view of the prior statute to require a
clear showing of purpose to abandon.73
Another difficulty in respect to abandonment statutes 'arises in
determining whether the original separation of the parent and child
was voluntary. It is accepted law that a child in foster care can be
found abandoned despite the fact that he is receiving care and the
parent is aware of this situation.74 The determinative issue is the be-
havior and intent of the parent rather than the circumstances of the
child. However, if the placement of the child was not initiated by the
parent, the meaning of his behavior and his intent may not be dear.
Most children in foster care in the United States were separated volun-
tarily from their parents, 75 but the question remains in many instances
whether a parent can be considered to have abandoned a child who
was initially taken from him involuntarily. The answer is a "qualified
yes." Where a statute or its case-law gloss provides that the failure to
satisfy parental obligations for a certain period of time is evidence of
abandonment, the period will not be considered to commence upon the
transfer of custody in the case of an involuntary removal of the child.70
On the other hand, subsequent to the involuntary removal, a parent's
failure to maintain the specified minimal contact with his child for
the time period provided by the statute can indeed support a finding
of abandonment.7 7 A good sense of semantics is therefore necessary to
determine when an involuntary separation constitutes an abandon-
ment.78 More important, however, is the fact that different standards
72 The statute is reprinted in pertinent part note 57 supra.
73 Cline v. Hartzler, 227 A.2d 210 (Del. 1967).
74 See cases note 67 supra.
75 M JAAS & ENoLER 349.
70 In re Maxwell, 117 Cal. App. 2d 156, 255 P.2d 87 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953); accord, In re
Conrich, 221 Cal. App. 2d 662, 34 Cal. Rptr. 658 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
77 See cases note 76 supra.
It is uncertain how long the statute is tolled by the fact that the separation is in.
voluntary. In In re Maxwell, 117 Cal. App. 2d 156, 255 P.2d 87 (Dist. CL App. 1953) for ex-
ample, the child was declared a ward of the court in 1947, and from the middle of 1948 to
January, 1951, the natural parent made no effort to communicate with her.
78 Cal. Civil CODE ch. 4 § 232 (West Supp. 1970) requires inter alia that for a child to be
declared free from parental custody and control he must be "left" with another with an
"intent on the part of such parent ... to abandon" him. California courts have experienced
some difficulty in reconciling this language with holdings that a child initially removed
involuntarily from his parent may be considered to have been abandoned.
In In re Maxwell, 117 Cal. App. 2d 156, 255 P.2d 87 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953), the court
quoted approvingly from In re Cattalini, 72 Cal. App. 2d 662, 665, 165 P.2d 250, 253 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1946):
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will be applied to measure parental conduct depending on whether or
not the placement was voluntary. This scheme is open to question. It
is quite possible that a parent who voluntarily places his child in foster
care is as concerned about him as a parent who resists placement is about
his, and conversely either may be the less concerned or fit. By presum-
ing without a factual inquiry a closer or better parental relationship in
the case of the parent whose child is placed involuntarily, courts penal-
ize this child by making it more difficult to free him for adoption.
Adoption without consent and abandonment petitions are usually
brought as part of an adoption proceeding in contrast with a separate
and prior proceeding to determine only whether to terminate parental
rights.79 This practice has several consequences. First, and most im-
portant, the fact that there has been no prior termination proceeding
may prevent the placement of the child in adoption and the occurrence,
consequently, of any adoption proceeding at all. Child-care agencies
According to Webster's International Dictionary, "leave" means "to put, deposit,
deliver, or the like, so as to allow to remain;- with a sense of withdrawing one-
self from; as leave your hat in the hall; we left our cards." Thus the term appears
to connote voluntary action. Therefore, it may not be said that appellant left his
children in the care and custody of the respondent when, by an order of the court,
they were taken from the joint control of their parents and placed in the sole care
and custody of the mother.
The opinion thus appears to concede that the child in question, who was involuntarily
removed from her mother by a wardship order, was not "left" within the meaning of the
CALIFORNIA WELFARE & INSTITuTIONS CODE § 701 (the predecessor of CAL. Civil CODE § 232).
Nevertheless, citing the rule that by action subsequent to a wardship proceeding a parent
can be guility of an abandonment, the court affirmed a judgment declaring the child free
from the custody and control of the mother. In effect, the court read out of the statute the
requirement that the child be "left." Accord, In re Barrett, 168 Cal. App. 2d 584, 336 P.2d
210 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
A somewhat different approach was taken in In re Conrich, 221 Cal. App. 2d 662, 34
Cal. Rptr. 658 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). More mindful of the requirement that the child be
"left" but equally unphased by it, this court reached back into time and conformed events
to the statutory requirements:
The fact that a judicial decree has placed custody of the child away from the
parents does not, however, necessarily prevent or destroy the element of "leaving"
because nonaction of the parents may convert into a leaving . . . that which
initially could not be regarded so.
Id. at 666, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
Given the wording of the California statute, it would not seem improper to construe a
leaving to include an involuntary separation and thus to avoid these semantic gymnastics.
However, the courts apparently felt compelled to recognize an early, restrictive decision
holding that the surrender must be voluntary to constitute a leaving. In re Cozza, 163 Cal.
514, 126 P. 161 (1912). In the majority of cases today, the requirement that the child be
"left" should not present much difficulty. The courts have developed the techniques just
described to deal with the statutory language, and, in addition, the legislature in 1965
enacted section 232.5, directing a liberal construction to protect the interests of the child.
Still, the statutory language and gloss remain unrejected and capable of preventing an
otherwise appropriate determination of abandonment.
79 See notes 53-54 supra. But see the combination neglect-dispensation with consent
procedure devised by a court in In re C., 63 Misc. 2d 1019, 314 N.Y.S.2d 255 (Fain. Ct. N.Y.
County 1970), discussed infra.
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often are reluctant to place a child in a pre-adoptive home who is not
legally free for adoption. Otherwise they would expose the child and
prospective parents to the grave risk that after they establish strong
emotional ties the child will be removed from the home or, because of
a court decision against termination, the child will be deemed non-
adoptable.80 Although the obvious answer is for the agency to petition
for termination in a prior proceeding (where this is possible), agency
workers are not always eager to go into court and to seek a termination
order, even when the possibility of the child's adoption is in question,)"
and the fact that the termination proceeding can be combined with a
subsequent adoption proceeding might serve as a reason to postpone
the termination petition. In most cases the prior proceeding simply
will not be available. Secondly, the concurrent determination of ter-
mination and adoption can introduce some confusion of the issues into
the proceeding. Although the attractiveness of the prospective parents
has no bearing on the fitness of the natural parent and the lack of fitness
of the natural parent does not render the adoptive parents any more
capable of caring for the child, some blurring of these two considera-
tions may be inevitable.8 2 This can lead to unfair treatment of the
natural parent in the case of exceptionally able adoptive parents8 3 and
to unfair treatment of the child in foster care who could have been
freed for adoption but for the unworthiness of the particular adoptive
applicants. The determination of the two issues in one proceeding can
confuse the natural parent as well as the court. Probably the significance
of the termination action will be diminished somewhat for him, and
consequently he may regard the approaching proceeding less as an oc-
casion where he will have to justify his behavior than one where he
must try to prevent the adoption of his child.8 4 Lastly, the fact that
80 Interview with Director of the Children's Bureau, Dep't of Public Welfare of the
State of Indiana, 1964, cited in Note, Dispensing with Parental Consent in Indiana Adoption
Proceedings, 40 IND. LJ. 378, 391 n. 70 (1965); 1956 REPORT OF THE TEMsPO aRY CoMMlssioN
ON THE COURTs TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK 66-67
(N.Y. Legis. Doc. (1956) No. 18); LEGISLATivE GuIEs, at 10.
81 See the discussion 256 infra.
82 Cases illustrating this point are hard to find, because opinions rarely contain
descriptions of the adoptive parents, and it is therefore impossible to infer how their
suitability for adoption affects or is affected by the determination of the natural parent's
fitness to retain custody.
83 It is to be remembered that a parent is entitled to the custody and control of his
child in the absence of a showing of lack of fitness. CLARK 591.
84 This possible source of conclusion may not be unvelcome to the parent. If he has
little desire to keep his child but at the same time is unwilling to admit deficiencies in his
relationship with the child, he might prefer a termination-adoption proceeding so that in
his mind he can place the responsibility for the termination of his rights on the fact of the
adoption rather than on the deficiencies in his own conduct. See Pennypacker, Reaching
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all the parties are gathered in one proceeding permits the natural
parent to express his displeasure at the turn of events to the adoptive
parents or simply to utilize his knowledge of their identity to attempt
to continue to see the child. The possibility of such undesirable inter-
action between the natural and adoptive parents constitutes another
criticism that has been made of proceedings in which both termination
and adoption petitions are determined. 5 In summary, it can be said that
proceedings in which termination and adoption petitions are both de-
termined can be unfair to the natural parent, the adoptive parents,
and the child.
III. THE NEw YORK PERMANENT NEGLECT STATUTE
Until 1959 attempts in New York to free foster children for adop-
tion had to proceed under an adoption statute which dispensed with the
requirement of parental consent if the parent had abandoned his
child. 6 There was no provision for a separate judicial proceeding to
terminate parental rights.87 As a result, New York experienced several
of the problems described in Section II. A large number of children
remained in long-term foster care when, if they could have been
made legally eligible for adoption, they might have been placed in
adoptive homes.8 Secondly, by speaking only to the more specific and
extreme conduct of abandonment rather than behavior considered to
indicate a lack of parental fitness, the statute placed more emphasis on
the rights of the parent than on the interests of the child.89 Third, at-
tempts in New York to free children for adoption had to contend with
a gloss to the statute which called for a strict construction of the statu-
tory language. 90 In response to these problems,91 the legislature enacted
Decisions to Initiate Court Action to Free Children for Adoption, 40 CmLD WELFARE 11
(Dec. 1961).
A preliminary study of the feelings of parents upon placing their children in short-
term foster care (3-12 months) appears in Jenkins, Separation Experiences of Parents Whose
Children Are in Foster Care, 48 Craw WgL.ra= 334 (1969). The author found the most
common reported feelings to be sadness and worry, in contrast to relief.
85 Note, Legislative and Judicial Recognition of the Distinction Between Custody and
Termination Orders in Child Neglect Cases, 7 J. F.A. L. 66, 68 (1967); Comment, Termi-
nation of Parental Rights to Free Child for Adoption, 32 N.Y.U.L.REv. 579 582 (1957).
It should be noted, however, that the authors of the former articles as well as this writer
found no cases to illustrate this danger.
86 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
87 1956 REPORT OF TnE TEMPoRARY COMMISSION on TE COURTS To THE GOVERNOR AND
THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK 66 (N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 18 (1956)).
88 Id. at 68.
89 Id. at 69.
90 In People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 542, 104 N.E.2d 895, 896 (1952),
the court said,
No court can, for any but the gravest reasons, transfer a child from its natural
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the permanent neglect statute.92 By omitting the words "abandoned"
and "best interests" this statute was born free of a gloss carried over
parent to any other person .. since the right of a parent, under natural law, to
establish a home and bring up children is a fundamental one and beyond the
reach of any court....
Potential inroads on the doctrine of strict construction were made in two more recent
decisions. In In re Knapp, 3 Misc. 2d 840, 156 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1956),
the court in effect established a procedure under which permanent termination of parental
rights could be sought and granted in a separate judicial proceeding when the parent,
without having shown a dear purpose to abandon his child, has given the child sufficiently
little attention or care. The case involved the special circumstance that the mother had
signed an authorization permitting her children to be placed in adoption if she did not
visit them for twelve consecutive months. Nevertheless, despite this fact and the pro forma
finding that the parents had abandoned their children, the court addressed its opinion
beyond the instant case. The court judged the parent in terms of her fitness to retain her
parental rights rather than merely in terms of abandonment, dispensed in the instant
proceeding with the requirement of parental consent to an adoption petition brought in a
subsequent proceeding, and announced that the decision was intended to serve as a guide to
facilitate the adoption of many of the other children in foster care whose parents have
abandoned them but still refuse to consent to their adoption. The second decision is
Application of Mittenthal, 37 Misc. 2d 502, 235 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Faro. Ct. Bronx County 1962),
a habeas corpus proceeding to regain custody of a child after custody had been temporarily
removed. Mittenthal held that although a parent may not be unfit in the sense of being
unable to give proper care to some or even most children, he may be found unfit to care
for the particular child in question. Although this case involved only a temporary removal
of custody and the court noted that in these circumstances the concept of unfitness may be
applied with greater flexibility, the decision still had relevance to proceedings for perma-
nent termination. It introduced the notion that an absolute lack of fitness was not required
to prevent the return of custody to a parent. Rather, if upon examination the court finds
that the relationship of the parent with the particular child indicated a lack of fitness, the
court may act to protect the interests of the child. By analogy, a court in a proceeding for
permanent termination might modify the requirement that conduct absolute in nature waz
necessary to establish an abandonment, and it might look instead to the relationship of the
parent with the child to decide whether to act to protect the interests of the child.
Neither Knapp nor Mittenthal, however, had much of an impact on the New York
courts. For example, in In re Lewis, 35 Misc. 2d 117, 230 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County
1962), a proceeding by a child-care agency to obtain permanent custody of a child in its
care so as to be able to place the child in adoption, the court, citing People ex rel. Portnoy
v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 104 N.E.2d 895 (1952), held that it could not terminate the rights
of the parent unless it could determine that she ".... will never in the future be fit or able
to care for or support . . ." the child. 35 Misc. 2d at 119, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 482. But see In
re C., 63 Misc. 2d 1019, 314 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1970), discussed infra pp. 251-252.
91 The "Permanently Neglected" Child, at 2.
92 N.Y. FAs. CT. Acr §§ 611-634 (McKinney 1963). The core provisions appear as fol-
lows:
Sec. 611. Permanently neglected child
A "permanently neglected child" is a person under eighteen years of age who
has been placed in the care of an authorized agency, either in an institution or
in a foster home, and whose parent or custodian has failed for a period of more
than one year following the placement or commitment of such child in the care
of an authorized agency substantially and continuously or repeatedly to maintain
contact with and plan for the future of the child, although physically and finan-
cially able to do so, notwithstanding the agency's diligent effort to encourage and
strengthen the parental relationship. In the event that the parent defaults after
due notice of a proceeding to determine such neglect, such physical and finan-
cial ability of such parent may be presumed by the court.
Sec. 614. Originating proceeding permanently to terminate custody
A proceeding permanently to terminate the parent's or other custodian's
custody of a child is originated by a petition, alleging.
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from other contexts and an earlier time. On the positive side, the
statute speaks directly to the situation of the parent who deserts his
child in long-term foster care, and it provides specific conditions which
when met will permit a court to terminate permanently the rights
of the parent.
The first condition that must be satisfied for an order of permanent
termination is that the parent must have failed in his responsibilities
for at least a year following placement. 93 In comparison with some
other statutes this period may be long.9 4 Certainly a parent who is
manifestly unfit to care for his child can indicate this in less time than
a year. Moreover, the welfare of the child often demands that he be
placed in adoption sooner than a year after entering foster care. Young
children and babies especially require a warm and intimate maternal
relationship, 5 and in many cases this can be provided only by place-
ment in a permanent home. In addition, children are most adoptable
when very young; by the age of two they are markedly less desirable to
(A) the child is a person under eighteen years of age;
(B) the child has been placed in the care of an authorized agency, either in
an institution or in a foster home;
(C) the authorized agency has made diligent efforts to encourage and
strengthen the parental relationship and specifying the efforts made;
(D) the parent or custodian, notwithstanding the agency's efforts, has failed
for a period of more than one year following the placement or commitment of
such child in the care of an authorized agency substantially and continuously or
repeatedly to maintain contact with and plan for the future of the child although
physically and financially able to do so; and
(E) the moral and temporal interests of the child require that the parents'
or other custodian's custody of the child be terminated permanently.
931d. § 611.
94 See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE ch. 4 §§ 232-233 (West Supp. 1970) (six months). On the
other hand, the California statute requires as an additional condition for termination that
the parent have had an intent to abandon the child.
The Children's Bureau's Guides for the Termination of Parental Rights also is more
liberal in this respect. Section 4(b) provides,
A petition for termination of the parent-child relationship with respect to a
parent who is not the petitioner . . . may be granted where the court finds that
one or more of following conditions exists: (1) that the parent has abandoned
the child in that the parent has made no effort to maintain a parental relation-
ship with such child....
LEGISLATIVE GUIDES, at 40.
Depending on the court's opinion as to how long a parent can neglect a child in
foster care while still being considered to maintain a parental relationship-obviously, a
failure to visit the child for a week could not support an order of permanent termination-
this statute would permit periods much shorter than a year to be sufficient in otherwise
clear cases of parental inadequacy. On the other hand, like the California statute this
statute has a restrictive aspect: it conditions termination on the fact that the parent has
made no effort to maintain a parental relationship. Although the nature of the parental
relationship may be such as to require that any effort to maintain it be a significant and
not an isolated or token effort, it seems that lesser parental efforts will avert an order of
permanent termination under the Children's Bureau statute as opposed to that under the
New York statute.
95 E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SocIErY 72-80, 247-251 (2d ed. 1963); J. BowLtY, ATrACH-
MENT AND Loss (1969).
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adoptive parents 8 Any unnecessary delay in finding an adoptive home
for a child during his first several months can reduce significantly his
chances of being adopted at all. Finally, it has been found that in most
instances a child will be taken back by his parents, if at all, within a
year.9 7 To allow no petition for termination to be brought for at least
a year might therefore grant parents an unnecessarily long time to
show an interest in recovering their child. On the other hand, section
611 does not differentiate among the circumstances that lead to foster
placement, and it treats the parent who places a newly born child in
foster care and probably does not intend ever to take him back the same
as the parent who suffers a temporary misfortune but who expects to
recover his child afterward. Section 611 also speaks more to the border-
line parent than the extreme, and in this case a year may well be
necessary to ascertain a lack of parental fitness. A period much shorter
than this would be unfair to a parent temporarily unable to care for his
child but basically capable of fulfilling his parental responsibilities. 8
By the same token it would be unfair to a child in foster care by cutting
him off from his natural parent. Unless a statute were to provide that
termination may occur after a shorter period of time when it is a baby
who is placed in foster care, 99 a year is probably a reasonable length of
time to see if a parent is interested in and capable of caring for his
child.
The provision that the parent must have failed for a period of a
year does not specify whether the year may be any continuous twelve
month period between the time of placement and the time the petition
for termination is brought or whether it must include the twelve months
immediately prior to the filing of the petition. Common sense suggests
the former construction. If the statutory period were construed to have
96 AMERICAN ACADY OF PEDIATRICS, CoMMITTEE ON ADOPTION, ADOPTION OF CHILDREN
2 (1967).
Almost two-thirds of all children adopted by unrelated persons in 1968 were less
than 3 months old when placed in an adoptive home, compared with 59 percent
five years earlier. Conversely, an estimated 13 percent of the children adopted in
1968 were placed after they were a year old as against 18 percent in 1963.
ADOPTIONS IN 1968, at 1-2.
As this study goes on to indicate, however, this data does not necessarily mean that
efforts to place older children are showing decreasing success. Rather,
the success of agencies in encouraging referral of babies in early infancy, and in
developing adoption plans as promptly as circumstances permit tends to reduce
the number of such children in need of adoption.
Id.
97 MAAS & ENGLRM 350-51.
9S In view of the infrequency of proceedings brought under the New York statute
it may be questioned whether this danger is real.
99 This approach is adopted by DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1101 (Supp. 1968).
See also the suggested modification of the New York statute 261-262 infra.
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to include the most recent twelve months, then circumstances which
can be expected sometimes to arise prior to the commencement of
proceedings would prevent an order of termination in cases which
otherwise called for it. For example, the agency might decide to end
its efforts to strengthen the parental relationship some time before
it formally initiates the proceeding,100 the parent might become physi-
cally or financially unable to maintain contact or plan for the future
of her child,101 or the parent, anticipating the filing of the petition,
might respond with a temporary change of behavior. Also, parental
failure for a continuous period of a year, even if not the most recent
twelve months, raises strong doubts about thekind of care that such
a parent would provide in the future. The cdnstruction that the year
may consist of any continuous twelve month period also receives sup-
port from the related case law interpreting abandonment statutes. 10 2
In addition, section 614(e), which conditions an order of termination
on the fact that the "moral and temporal interests" of the child require
it, seems to contemplate the possibility that a parent might have re-
formed since his failure for a year to maintain contact with and plan for
his child,10 and it thereby implicitly recognizes that the period of
dereliction need not include the twelve months immediately prior to
the petition. For some of these reasons, the construction that the year
may be any continuous twelve month period has received endorse-
ment by New York courts.104
The heart of the New York statute lies in the words, "substan-
tially and continuously or repeatedly to maintain contact with and
plan for the future of the child." This is the focus of the draftsmen's
intention to depart from the overworked concept of abandonment and
to deal explicitly with the case of a child in the care of a social
agency.10 The quoted language imposes two requirements on the
parent, to maintain contact with the child and to plan for the child's
future, and it specifies that the parent must perform these activities
"substantially and continuously or repeatedly."'1 6 The first require-
100 In re Jones, 59 Misc. 2d 69, 297 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
101 In re B., 60 Misc. 2d 662, 303 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
102 See, e.g., In re Maxwell, 117 Cal. App. 2d 156, 255 P.2d 87 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
103 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACr § 614(e) (McKinney 1963) thereby mitigates the unfairness that
might be considered to be present in terminating the rights of a parent on the basis of
conduct from an earlier period in his life. See the discussion at p. 2,18 infra.
104 In re Jones, 59 Misc. 2d 69, 297 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1969); In re B.,
60 Misc. 2d 662, 303 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
105 The "Permanently Neglected" Child, at 2.
106 It is possible to construe these adverbs to apply only to the requirement of
maintaining contact, but it seems more reasonable to read all three adverbs as modifying
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ment contemplates frequent meetings between: the parent and child.107
Contact can take place in a single act, but the statute says that the
contact must be maintained.108 That is, it must be preserved or con-
tinued.109 This meaning is expressly reinforced by the adverbs "con-
tinuously" and "repeatedly." How many meetings will be considered
frequent is of course impossible to specify. If a parent lives at an incon-
venient distance from his child, a lesser number would probably be
sufficient. If a parent neglects his child for several months but then
begins to reestablish a relationship with him and indicates the likeli-
hood of continued interest, the number of meetings necessary to have
maintained contact might also be lower. The word "contact" has con-
notations of communication," 0 and it is probable that in selecting this
word the draftsmen of the New York statute had more in mind than
just the contiguous presence of the bodies of the parent and child. Nev-
ertheless, it is difficult to point to the kinds of interaction that would
fail to satisfy the statutory requirement. If in all his meetings with his
child a parent were not communicative at all, contact could probably
be found wanting. On the other hand, if the parent were hostile to
the child or, more generally, if the parent acted in a manner that kept
the two emotionally distant, the requirement of contact might have
to be found satisfied. Communication is present even if there is no
rapport. It would seem to depart too far from the primary meaning of
the words to hold that a parent who frequently sees his child and who
communicates with him does not "maintain contact.""'
Besides maintaining contact, a parent must "substantially . . .
plan for the future of the child" to prevent an order of termination.
Since the child's future that is contemplated is one that finds him
both requirements or to read "substantially" as modifying "plan" and "continuously or
repeatedly" as modifying "maintain contact."
The sense of the statute is to reject as inadequate anything less than a minimal bona
fide parental concern. It would be anomalous for the draftsmen to specify that contact
must be more than token but to omit a similar qualification of the requirement to plan.
107 The agencies construe the parent-child relationship which they are mandated
to encourage, to include face-to-face contact rather than contact merely through
letters or other detached methods. ... [This] seems a reasonable and proper
effectuation of the statutory purpose.
In re B., 60 Misc. 2d at 665, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
108 N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr §§ 611, 614 (McKinney 1963).
109 RANDom HousE DIaIONAnY oF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 865 (Unabridged ed. 1967).
llOld. 315; In re Kiug, 82 App. Div. 2d 915, 916, 802 N.Y.S.2d 418, 420 (1st Dep't 1969).
rev'g In re Clear, 58 Misc. 2d 699, 296 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1969). The
court said "'Contact' must be interpreted to mean a meaningful contact where a parent
has exercised her parental obligation and has provided love, affection and guidance."
111 In a case like the one hypothesized the child would not be without protection.
Even if termination could not be ordered, the agency still can control and supervise the
visits of the parent and child. N.Y. Soc. SEavwcss LAw §§ 371, 383 (McKinney 1966); In re
Jones, 59 Misc. 2d 69, 297 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
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restored to his parent," 2 the parent's plans will have to focus as much
on what the parent intends to do with his own life as what kind of
future he intends for his child. This can be no small task. A parent
whose child is in long term foster care frequently is not leading the
kind of constructive and purposeful life that lends itself to pleasing
projections." 3 The parent also has to play an active role in formulating
these plans. While the statute provides for "diligent efforts" by the
agency to "strengthen the parental relationship""' 4 and a measure of
reality suggests that in many instances acceptable plans could be com-
posed only with the help of agency workers, the statute is worded to per-
mit a finding of permanent neglect when the "parent . . . has failed
... to plan for the future of the child.""15 This requirement is sound.
If the parent participates in the planning process only to the extent
of assenting to carefully formed plans, her commitment to the
plans may be uncertain. What the parent must do to "plan" is to
project a course of action" 6 for her and her child's lives which should
include considerations of when she will take back her child, how she
will support him, and whether she will be able to supply the love and
attention that he needs. That these projections must be thought out
and fairly complete is indicated by the wording that the parent "sub-
stantially... plan.. . ." In addition, the projections must be plausible:
the statute requires the parent to plan, not to speculate." 7 "Substantial
planning" may appear in this discussion to demand a degree of self-
awareness, insight and resolution that most people lack, especially
112 Despite literal compliance, it is unlikely that a parent could plan for the future of
his child within the meaning of the statute by developing a carefully considered plan
to leave his child indefinitely in foster care. See In re Klug, 32 App. Div.. 2d at 916, 302
N.Y.S.2d at 420-21 (Tilzer, J., concurring).
11s This is true, for example, of the parents in In re Clear, 58 Misc. 2d 699, 296
N.Y.S.2d 184 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1969); and In re Jones, 59 Misc. 2d 69, 297 N.YS.2d
675 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
114 N.Y. FtA. Cr. ACT §§ 611, 614 (McKinney 1963).
115 Id. (Emphasis added).
116 RANDOM HOUsE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1100 (Unabridged ed. 1967).
117 In re Jones, 59 Misc. 2d 69, 297 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1969), makes this distinction by
holding that the parent must begin to implement his plan although he need not con-
summate it. The court said that unless "substantially plan" were interpreted to require
some act to advance the accomplishment of the plan, "the provision that the parent must
be 'physically and financially able' to plan . . . would be pointless, for physical and
financial capability is irrelevant to a phantasy-plan." 59 Misc. 2d at 73, 297 N.Y.S.2d at
680. Accord, In re Klug, 32 App. Div. 2d at 916, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 421 (1969) (Tilzer, J.,
concurring). However, it is not clear that action to implement the plan is necessary. As
applied to "plan," the phrase "physically and financially able" more likely means that the
permanent neglect statute does not apply to a parent who will not be able physically or
financially to support or care for his child. On the other hand, the fact that a parent takes
no steps to implement his plans obviously bears on his commitment to them and the
likelihood of their eventual realization.
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perhaps the mother of a child in long-term foster care.11 8 Yet the
statute was designed to measure the interests and capabilities of just
such a person. Therefore, so that the planning requirement will not
become simply a device to permit termination in nearly all cases where
the other statutory conditions are met, the standards to evaluate the
adequacy of the parent's plans should not be set unrealistically high.11 9
Courts will have to act with sensitivity and care in determining
whether the parent's plans are sufficiently credible and sound to satisfy
the statutory requirement.
A court cannot terminate a parent's rights under the New York
statute unless it finds that the agency made "diligent efforts to en-
courage and strengthen the parental relationship."' 20 This provision,
distinctive of the New York statute,12' expresses the judgment that so-
ciety should not remove a child permanently from his parent unless it
has first tried to reestablish 22 the parent-child relationship.123 It also
expresses the judgment that parental failure, no matter how clear, is
118 In re Jones, 59 Misc. 2d 69, 297 N.YS.2d 675 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1969); In re
Clear, 58 Misc. 2d 693, 296 N.YS.2d 184 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
119 The possibiilty that a parent's plans may be measured by an unfairly high standard
is suggested by the discussion in Comment, The Custody Question and Child Neglect
Rehearings, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 478 (1968), although this article discusses the problem of
parental petitions for the return of neglected children rather than petitions for the
permanent termination of parental rights.
120 N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr. §§ 611, 614 (McKinney 1963).
121 See, e.g., CAL. CIvIL CODE § 232 (West Supp. 1970).
The Children's Bureau's Legislative Guides also omits the condition that the failure
to maintain the parental relationship must have occurred in the face of agency efforts to
strengthen it. Section 4(b) provides,
A petition for termination of the parent-child relationship with respect to a
parent who is not the petitioner ... may be granted where the court finds that
one or more of the following conditions exists: (1) that the parent has abandoned
the child in that the parent has made no effort to maintain a parental relation-
ship with such a child ....
LEGiSLATIVE Guons, at 40.
The Child Welfare League of America seems to take a compromise position on the
issue whether, before termination, the child-care agency must try to strengthen the
parental relationship. It has said that there should be legal provision for the termination
of parental rights "where it has been determined that, even with help of community
agencies, the parents in all probability will not be able to perform their parental duties,
and are either unable or unwilling to relinquish the child." CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF
AmC=A, STANDARDs FOR ADOPTION SERVIcE 728 (1968). This language seems to imply that
the determination of probable lack of fitness can be made even where the agency has not
extended its help. If it had been thought that termination should not be ordered where
the agency has not first tried to strengthen the parental relationship, the standard would
have said, "where even after help of community agencies, it has been determined that the
parents in all probability will not be able to perform their parental duties .. " Although
agency efforts thus are not required, this standard, in common with the New York statute,
expresses the idea that parental incapacity by itself is insufficient to support an order of
termination. If it is thought that the parental relationship could be adequately strength-
ened through the help of the agency, then the parent, however unfit, can prevent a
termination order.
122 Or to establish for the first time.
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insufficient by itself to support an order of permanent termination.
Whether the child-care agency has made the required "diligent efforts"
therefore can be a central issue in any proceeding for permanent ter-
mination.
If sustained for a period of at least a year, efforts which clearly
meet the statutory requirement are supporting a parent's plans to
obtain work and establish a home for herself and her child and initi-
ating and facilitating visits between the parent and child.124 Closer
questions are presented when the efforts are less complete than these
or when they are sustained for a period shorter than a year. Since the
New York Statute reads that the parent's failure must have continued
for at least a year and that this failure must have occurred despite the
efforts of the agency to the contrary, 2 5 it is possible to construe the
statute to require the agency to have continued its efforts for at least
the year in which the parent's failure is determined to have occurred.
Support for this construction might be found in the requirement that
the agency's efforts be "diligent." At some point, efforts to encourage and
strengthen the parental relationship will be too brief to be considered
diligent, and one can posit a year as the minimally acceptable period
over which the efforts must be sustained. The better reading of the
statutory language, however, would not find the agency required to
sustain its efforts for at least a year. In the first place, the statute on its
face makes no such requirement. It provides only that the parent must
have failed for a period of more than a year.126 If the requirement had
been intended, the draftsmen could easily have made it explicit by
saying, "notwithstanding the agency's diligent efforts over this period
to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship." In the second
place, it seems more sensible to determine whether the agency's efforts
were continued long enough to be considered diligent in the context
of the circumstances of the particular case rather than by an arbitrary
period of a year. 27 If a parent were clearly unfit despite six months of
constant and persistent efforts of the agency to strengthen the parental
relationship and the prognosis for improvement were completely nega-
tive, it would seem realistically pointless and economically wasteful to
require the agency to continue its efforts for another six months.
123 The "Permanently Neglected" Child, at 3.
124 In re Jones, 59 Misc. 2d 69, 72, 297 N.Y.S.2d 675, 679 (Faro. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
125 N.Y. FA.sM. Cr. Acr §§ 611, 614 (McKinney 1963).
126 Id.
127 It can reasonably be argued that the statute should not have required the period
of parental neglect to be at least a year and that it is more sensible to determine, in the
context of the circumstances of the particular case, whether the neglect continued long
enough to constitute a failure of parental responsibility.
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Similarly, if the efforts of the agency were just beginning to show re-
sults at the end of a year, it would seem irresponsible to consider the
agency's duty satisfied on the three hundred sixty-fifth day of its care
for the child.
Similar considerations arise in regard to the nature of the agency's
actions. Is the agency expected to make certain, specific efforts, or is the
agency to make those efforts it considers necessary within the context
of the circumstances of the particular case? The latter test seems the
more appropriate. It is even more difficult to devise meaningful require-
ments for general application with respect to the nature and quality of
effective therapeutic efforts than it is with respect to the time over which
such efforts are to extend. In one case an agency might want to con-
centrate on the parent's problems in personal relationships generally,
while in another case it might want to deal with a specific problem
between the parent and child. To expect certain, specific efforts to be
made in every case regardless of the particular circumstances would be,
again, realistically pointless and economically wasteful. In addition,
there is no language in sections 611 and 614 from which to infer any
specific efforts that would be required, in contrast with the presence
of language to support an implied requirement of a one-year duration
of the efforts. The most important argument for agency discretion in
deciding on the types of efforts to be made is that the child-care agency
must have a broad flexibility in its relationship with the parent so as
not to jeopardize its relationship with the child. The agency is respon-
sible by statute for the welfare of the child in its custody. 28 If specific
efforts were required of the agency under the permanent neglect statute,
then where these efforts were inconsistent with the best interests of the
child, the permanent neglect statute would not be available. For
example, if the agency were required specifically to arrange visits
between the parent and child as part of its diligent efforts, then when
the effects of these visits might be-detrimental to the child, the agency
could not arrange them without violating its statutory responsibilities
to the child. By not arranging the visits, however, the agency will have
failed to satisfy the requirement for permanent termination that it
make diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship, and the
court will not be able to free the child from the custody of his parent.
Moreover, it is possible that a permanent neglect statute which re-
quired specific efforts as part of the agency's "diligent efforts" could
place the child-care agency in a hopeless bind. This would happen if,
128Soc. SEmvcEs LAW § 371 (McKinney 1966) as amended (McKinney Supp. 1970);
N.Y. FAm. Cr. ACr § 119 (McKinney 1963).
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as is arguable, an obligation resides in the child-care agency to act
under the permanent neglect statute. That is, by virtue of the statute
an agency that takes a child into its care might be under an obligation
to make diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship and,
that failing, to petition for permanent termination. 12 9 If diligent efforts
required the arrangement of visits, and if these visits might be detri-
mental to the child, the agency, under an obligation to make diligent
efforts, would be caught between its obligation under the permanent
neglect statute to arrange the visits and its obligation for the welfare of
a child in its custody not to arrange the visits. Obviously, this statutory
impasse - whether just the unavailability of the permanent neglect
statute or the conflict between it and the other statutes- can and
should be avoided by construing the requirements of the agency under
the permanent neglect statute to be consistent with its responsibilities
to a child in its care and, therefore, by considering the permanent ne-
glect statute to contemplate flexibility in the nature of the efforts
exerted by the agency.
Several of these issues appeared in In re Clear,13 a recent New
York case. In a proceeding brought under section 614 of the New York
Family Court Act' 3 ' to terminate permanently the custody of a mother
and to award custody of her child to the petitioner-child-care agency,
there was no doubt that the respondent-mother was incompetent to
care for her child. In addition to the fact of her emotional problems' 32
the respondent had a second, older child who had been in placement for
nine years and whom she had visited only sporadically for the preceding
five years.'33 The child in question was described as making excellent
progress in the foster family with whom he had been placed. 34 He also
was described as exhibiting a "negative reaction" to his mother's visits,
which were marked by her "erratic behavior" and "bizarre appear-
ance."' 35 Despite the Family Court's conclusion that it would be in the
129 In In re Bonez, 48 Misc. 2d 900, 266 N.Y.S. 2d 756 (1966), the court said that
the provision for the termination of parental custody by reason of permanent
neglect ... establish[es] the clear legislative intent to prevent the indefinite
placement of children away from home, their loss of visibility, and the failure
to plan adequately for them.
48 Misc. 2d at 906, 266 N.YS.2d at 761.
130 58 Misc. 2d 699, 296 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Faro. Ct. N.Y. County 1969), rev'd per curiam
sub nom. In re Klug, 82 App. Div. 915, 302 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Ist Dep't 1969).
131 Reprinted note 92 supra.
132 "The record, the testimony of the social worker, and observation by this court
substantiate the emotional disturbance and limitations of this mother as a mother now or
in the foreseeable future." 58 Misc. 2d at 707-08, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
13358 Misc. 2d at 707, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
'34 Id.
135 Id.
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child's best interests to terminate the rights of the parent,136 the petition
was denied on the ground that the statutory requirement that the agency
make diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relation-
ship had not been met.137 The agency was found to have arranged for
frequent casework conferences with the mother and to have provided
for visits of the mother and child. 38 Whether these activities by
themselves might have constituted diligent efforts within the meaning
of sections 611 and 614, the Family Court looked at them in the context
of additional events. Within five months after his admission to the
care of the agency, the child was placed in a foster home. 3 9 At some
point in the course of dealing with the mother the agency concluded
that the welfare of the child (and of the mother, too,) would be best
served by the child's adoption, and it directed its efforts toward obtain-
ing the consent of the mother.1 40 In view of the disturbing effects of the
visits on the child, the agency soon ceased to encourage them or al-
lowed them only under supervision. 141 By the decision to seek adoption
and the imposition of restrictions on the visits, 1 42 the agency was found
to have deviated from its statutory requirement to make diligent efforts
to strengthen the parental relationship.143 The court did not fault the
agency for its actions. On the contrary, the court considered the agency
136 58 Misc. 2d at 708, 296 N.Y..2d at 192.
137 Id.
Although the Family Court made no finding on the issue, it appears that the require-
ment that "the parent . . . has failed ... substantially and continuously or repeatedly to
maintain contact with and plan for the future of the child" was satisfied. Respondent had
visited her child on the average less than five times a year. Id. Also, respondent's plans
for the future of the child were deemed dearly deficient. The court found "no evidence"
to sustain respondent's hope of eventually making a home for her children. Id. In the
appellate court, however, the majority thought that further proof should be submitted on
this issue (32 App. Div. 2d at 915, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 419), and the appellate dissent thought
that it was "affirmatively establishe[d]" that the respondent had not failed to maintain
contact within the statutory requirement (32 App. Div. 2d at 917, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 422
(McNally, J., dissenting).
It can be observed here that a petition brought under the New York abandonment
statute (N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § Ill (McKinney 1964)) would have had little chance of
success in this case. The fact of the visits each year would probably have been sufficient
to negate any attempt to show an intent to abandon, especially in view of the strict con-
struction given to the statute. See note 90 supra. Moreover, respondent had persistently
rejected the idea of surrendering her child. 58 Misc. 2d at 708, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
138 58 Misc. 2d at 706, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 707, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
141 Id.
142 The court did not consider the child's placement in the foster home a ground for
objection.
143 After noting the agency's decision to seek adoption and its efforts to obtain the
consent of the mother, the court stated, "The caseworkers . . . did not in fact make any
significant effort to strengthen the parental relationship as required . 58 Misc. 2d at
707, 296 N.YS.2d at 192.
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to have acted "in good conscience" in seeking the adoption of the
child and to have followed its "first responsibility [which was] ... for
the welfare of the child in its custody" in permitting visits only under
supervision.144 In brief, the Family Court recognized the statutory obli-
gations of the agency to a child in its custody and found that in this
case at least the child-care agency could not at the same time have acted
in accordance with these obligations and satisfied the statutory require-
ment that it make diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relation-
ship.
The construction by the Family Court of the "diligent efforts" re-
quirement is open to criticism. First, the court correctly pointed to the
possible conflict of obligations that could arise from the simultaneous
operation of the permanent neglect statute and the statutes making the
agency responsible for the welfare of a child in its care. However, the
court failed adequately to show the presence of such a conflict in this
case. The promotion of the interests of the child does not necessarily
imply the failure to promote the parental relationship. Secondly, acting
on the assumption that this case did present such a conflict, the court
made no attempt to reconcile the conflicting statutory obligations.
Instead of inquiring whether, in view of its responsibilities to the child,
the agency did all that it could to strengthen the parental relationship,
the court considered the statutes to be irreconcilable and any efforts
under one to violate its responsibilities under the other.145 Both of
these criticisms will be elaborated.
The fact that the agency is responsible for the welfare of the child
does not mean that it cannot consistently, with this responsibility, work
to strengthen the parental relationship. Different kinds of efforts inhere
in these tasks. Placing a child in a foster home, for example, is not
inconsistent with helping the mother to gain greater insight into her-
self and her feelings toward her child. In the instant case the Family
Court found the agency to have failed to satisfy the statute because,
although it arranged frequent casework conferences with the mother
and provided for visitation by the mother with the child, at some point
in working with the mother it began to seek her surrender of the child
and it ceased to encourage the visits or allowed them only under
supervision. That the visits were supervised or no longer encouraged
144 Id. at 708, 296 N.YS.2d at 192.
145 See note 143 supra.
After remarking with respect to the restrictions on the visits that the agency could
not have acted otherwise "without violating its responsibility for the welfare of the child
in its custody," the court continued, "Yet that is what the present statute requires as a
condition to terminating parental rights." 58 Misc. 2d at 708, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
[Vol. 46-215
PERMANENT NEGLECT STATUTE
does not seem inconsistent with the existence of diligent efforts to
strengthen the parental relationship. Inconsistency can be found only
if strengthening the parental relationship were considered to require
complete visitation privileges. Yet it is difficult to imagine that a paren-
tal relationship would become robust if the mother were allowed to
assert unchecked a destructive influence on her child. Indeed, super-
vision and restriction of the visits might benefit the parent as well as
the child. Protected from his mother's erratic behavior, a child might
not react so sharply and negatively to her visits, and the two might be
able to establish a closer relationship. Certainly in the instant case
there was nothing to show that the agency's actions in respect to visita-
tion interfered with its efforts to strengthen the parental relationship.
Whether the efforts of the agency to obtain the mother's surrender
of her child conflicted with its obligation to strengthen the parental re-
lationship presents a more complicated question. The agency case-
workers were said to have "focus[ed] their efforts" on obtaining the
surrender.146 If only a small portion of the time spent with the mother
were used for this purpose, then in the remaining time the agency might
still have made diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship.
The presentation of the issue of surrender might even have sharpened
the mother's awareness of the relevant issues and alternatives involved.
Under these circumstances, there is no necessary conflict between act-
ing in the interests of the child and acting to strengthen the parental
relationship. On the other hand, the agency might have devoted a
substantial or major part of its efforts with the mother toward obtain-
ing her consent. In this case the responsibilities of the agency to the
child can be taken to have conflicted with its efforts to strengthen the
parental relationship. If in fact the Family Court found that the efforts
to obtain the mother's consent marked the end of the agency's efforts
to strengthen the parental relationship, then it regarded this fact as
conclusive evidence of the agency's failure to try to strengthen the
parental relationship. The better reading of the statutory scheme
would lead to the inquiry whether, in view of this conflict of obliga-
tions, the agency did all that it reasonably could to strengthen the
parental relationship and therefore can be considered to have satisfied
the statutory requirement.
Although the court's opinion is ambiguous, it seems to indicate
that the agency decided to seek adoption after it placed the child in the
foster home. The latter event occurred nearly five months after the
child was admitted to the agency's care. Whether the agency satisfied
14658 Misc. 2d at 707, 296 N.Y.S2d at 192.
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the statutory requirement therefore turns on the question whether
five months of frequent casework conferences and at least five months
of arranging and facilitating visitation constitute diligent efforts within
the meaning of the statute. The answer to such a question was seen 147
to depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. In In re Clear,
where the parent was manifestly unfit to assume the responsibilities of
parenthood, her capabilities were not expected to improve significantly
in the foreseeable future, and the child was making excellent progress
in his foster family, it seems that five months of casework con-
ferences (plus visitation) were sufficient to constitute diligent efforts
under the statute. To have spent more time probably would have been
pointless and wasteful. Although it does not appear to have been the
case, the agency might have made its decision to seek adoption prior
to the placement of the child, that is, at some time during the first
five months after the admission of the child to its care. The near com-
plete lack of fitness and potential for improvement of the respondent-
mother would have permitted the statute to be satisfied by a relatively
short series of casework conferences (plus visitation). Nevertheless, some
efforts of substance to improve the parental relationship would have
had to be made however hopeless they would seem and however ap-
parent it was that the child would be better off in a new home. The
agency's responsibility to the child does not relieve it of having to try to
strengthen the parental relationship. However, the Family Court's
opinion does not indicate what the agency's efforts consisted in and
whether they were adequate to satisfy the statute. The court's inquiry
stopped when it found that at some point in the history of the case
the agency became motivated primarily by the interests of the child.
The Appellate Division reversed the Family Court but in an opin-
ion that was hardly more lucid. The brief, per curiam opinion noted
that the chief support for the trial court's finding was "evidence of
efforts by the petitioner to help the mother surrender the child for the
sake of the child and the mother," and it held that "that proof, alone,
does not dictate a finding that the agency failed to meet the obligations
imposed by the statute. . . . It was, therefore, error for the Family
Court to assign such decisive weight to that factor .. . ."1 4A concurring
opinion emphasized that as the purpose of the statute was to help
the many children abandoned in long term foster care, the agency,
while trying to encourage the parental relationship, must also con-
sider the future of the child by planning for his adoption in case its
147 See pp. 237-240 supra.
148 32 App. Div. 2d at 915, 302 N.YS.2d at 419.
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efforts with the parent failed.149 Except for an instruction that further
proof on the issue of the agency's efforts should be submitted on
remand, no consideration was given to the question of the nature or
duration of the agency's efforts that would satisfy the statute in this
case. Nor did the court consider whether a potential conflict of
statutory obligations faced an agency in a case like this and, if so, how it
should be resolved.'" Two of the five members of the court dissented
and voted to affirm the ruling of the Family Court on the ground that
the evidence established that the respondent had not failed to main-
tain contact with her child within the meaning of the statute and that
the respondent was not physically or financially able to maintain con-
tact and plan for the future of the child. 51 Therefore, what this
difficult case can be taken to stand for is unclear, and the important
statutory questions it presented are still largely unanswered.
The New York "Permanent Neglect" Statute excludes from its
coverage the parent who is not physically or financially able to main-
tain contact with or plan for the future of his child. 52 To maintain
contact a parent must meet with the child often. 5 3 On the basis of
this construction it has been held that where a parent is hospitalized
for mental illness, he is not physically able to maintain contact within
the meaning of the statute. 5 4 Presumably the same result would follow
if the parent were immobilized because of physical illness or injury 55
or if he were in jail50 or a narcotics treatment center. In addition, it
would seem to make no difference whether the confinement is brought
about voluntarily or involuntarily. In either case the parent, once con-
fined, becomes unable to meet with his child. The statute seems to
149 22 App. Div. 2d at 916, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 420 (Tilzer, J., concurring). This opinion ap-
parently found the authority for the agency's concurrent efforts to place the child in
adoption in the permanent neglect statute itself, not in the statutes making the agency
responsible for the welfare of a child in its care. See note 128 supra.
150 By its holding, the court rejected the lower court's view, supra at p. 242 that the
statutory obligations were in irreconcilable conflict in this case. It is not clear, however,
whether the court recognized the presence of any conflict at all.
15132 App. Div. 2d at 917, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 422 (McNally, J., dissenting). Details were
not given as to how the respondent maintained contact with her child while neither
physically nor financially able.
The dissent also intimated that the respondent did not fail to plan for her child's
future within the meaning of the statute and that the agency was required to work on
strengthening the parental relationship for a period of a year. Id. The former point is
discussed in note 137 supra, and the latter supra at 237-240.
152 N.Y. FAm. CT. ACr. §§ 611, 614 (McKinney 1963).
153 See 234-235 supra.
154 In re B., 60 Misc. 2d 662, 303 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
155 In re Klug, 32 App. Div. 2d 915, 916, 302 N.YS.2d 418, 421 (1969) (Tilzer, J., con-
curring).
156 Id.
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require that the parent be physically able to plan for the future of
the child. The best sense to be made of this language is that the parent
must be physically able to execute his plans.157 In nearly all cases
physical ability to visit and to carry out plans will both be present or
absent. But it is possible for a parent to be unable only to execute
plans as when someone who is confined to a wheelchair is able to visit
his child but may not be able to provide a home for him. Such a parent
would not be affected by the termination statute, since the statute
conditions its applicability on ability to do both.
The question whether mental illness should be considered equiva-
lent to physical inability to maintain contact and plan for a child
arose in the recent case of In re B.158 Answering in the negative, the
court inferred from the purpose of the statute that the omission of
such a term as "mentally," "emotionally," or "psychically" was de-
liberate and that physical ability was intended to refer literally to
powers of locomotion.15 9 The court reasoned that in our culture all
parents who fail to see and plan for their children, although physically
and financially able to do so, are considered psychic-deviates. To distin-
guish among those whose deviation appears in the form of periodic
breakdowns (as was true of respondent in the instant case) and those
whose deviation shows itself in other ways such as an excessive use of
drugs or alcohol "would neither be feasible nor equitable." The "Per-
manent Neglect Statute" looks basically to the conduct of parents
toward their children rather than the character or condition of the
parent, and it is designed to terminate permanently the rights of
parents who, whatever their reasons, fail to show their children the
concern and responsibility to which they are entitled. 160
In the instant case the court's position is sound. While outside the
the hospital, the mother functioned sufficiently to move from New York
City to New Jersey and establish living quarters there independent of
her mother, to find and maintain employment, and to enter into
heterosexual relationships.' 6' It would have been difficult to find a lack
of physical ability here without seriously weakening the force of the
statute. On the other hand, in a case of severe mental illness it could
still be argued that the parent lacked the necessary mental coherence
157 See note 117 supra.
158 60 Misc. 2d 662, 303 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Faro. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
159 Id. at 666, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
160 Id. Thus viewing the objective of the statute as the promotion of the welfare of
the -child, the court rejected -the additional contention that the mentally ill respondent
was being punished for a condition beyond her control. Id. at 664, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 441.
161 Id. at 666, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 442-43.
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to direct his body into action, that therefore physical ability was absent,
and the the circumstances were sufficiently extreme so as not to under-
mine the thrust of the statute. The answer to a contention like this is
again the argument of legislative intent. Because the draftsmen of the
New York statute included several unusually restrictive provisions,
162
it seems fair to infer that they would have explicitly exempted a parent
for mental or emotional inability if such a feature had been intended.
The second ground for the inapplicability of the statute is the
financial inability of the parent to maintain contact and plan for the
child's future. Maintaining contact usually requires only minimal com-
muting expenses. Probably only when the parent lives at a great dis-
tance from the child would a question of financial ability arise. When
the words "financially able" are applied to the requirement of planning,
the language seems to mean that the parent must be financially able to
execute his plans. How much money a parent must have to be con-
sidered able to plan for his child's future is a difficult question. If
entitled to welfare payments, then the parent should at least be receiv-
ing them. Where a parent claims that he is entitled to larger welfare
payments than he is getting, the most useful way to deal with the
question of financial ability may be to expand the jurisdiction of the
court so as to allow the parent to join the local welfare officer as a
party to the proceeding.16 Actually, the receipt of welfare payments
hardly guarantees that the parent has enough money to manage a
healthy and comfortable household for herself and her children. In
determining financial ability the courts will have to look closely at the
income, needs, and expenses of the particular respondent to see whether
it can Tealistically be said that she is financially able to execute sound
plans for her child's future.
Exemption for physical or financial incapacity, another'64 of the
restrictive aspects of the New York statute,165 was probably included to
162 These are the provision that the failure must be for a period of at least a year, the
requirement that the agency make diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship,
and the exemption for physical or financial inability to maintain contact and plan for the
child's future.
163 This suggestion was made by Prof. Robert Cover of Columbia Law School.
164 See note 162 supra.
165 Most states have no such provision; e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.011 (1969); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-1, 9.1-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); PA. STAT. tit. 1, § 1.2 (1963) as
amended (Supp. 1970). CAL. Csvm CODE ch. 4, § 232 (West Supp. 1970) and DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 1101 (Supp. 1968), provide that failure to supply financial support is a ground for
termination of parental rights. In Adoption of Spangler, 61 Berks. 162 (Pa. 1969), termina-
tion was ordered despite respondent's lack of economic resources. But see MoNT. REy.
CODEs ANN. § 61-205 (1962) (failure to provide financial support is a ground for termination
only if the parent "is able" to provide it).
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assure fair treatment of the parent. Nevertheless, it can work the oppo-
site result for the child. By making termination of parental rights more
difficult when the parent is less able to care for his child, the exemp-
tion can prevent a child from being freed for adoption in those cases
where termination of parental rights seems most important. It is argu-
able that to provide for termination of parental rights for failure of
capacity to care for a child without exempting the parent with insuf-
ficient funds would constitute a denial of equal protection. 66 However,
the exemption for physical incapacity lacks this equal protection justi-
fication. Moreover, adequate protection for the parent in cases of
temporary physical disability can be found in section 614(e), which
conditions termination on the fact that it is in the moral and temporal
interests of the child.1 67 That is, it probably would not be in the best
interests of a child to cut him off from a parent who did not visit him
or who was unable to execute plans for his future because of a physical
incapacity which did not reasonably seem likely to continue. There-
fore, the exemption for physical incapacity seems inappropriate.
The final requirement under the New York statute which must be
satisfied for a court to order a permanent termination of all parental
rights is that "the moral and temporal interests of the child require
that the parents' or other custodian's custody of the child be terminated
permanently.' 68 This provision finds relevance in at least two contexts.
Where there has been an improvement in the parent's behavior sub-
sequent to his failure to maintain contact with and plan for the future
of the child, it is possible that it would not be in the interests of the
child to terminate the rights of the parent. If the parent has shown a
willingness and ability to assume responsibility for the child and if no
plans have been made for the child's adoption, there would be a strong
case against termination. On the other hand, where satisfactory arrange-
ments for adoption have been made, the moral and temporal interests
of the child might require termination even in the face of a showing of
parental reform. Since the relevant circumstances will vary greatly
from case to case, the weight to be given to the improvement in the
parent's behavior can be determined only on a case-by-case basis.
The second context in which section 614(e) is relevant is where an
adoptive home is not likely to be available for the child. This is all
too frequently the case with a minority group child or a child with a
166 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1955) "there can be no equal justice where
the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."
167 N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 614(e) (McKinney 1963).
168 Id.
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physical or mental handicap.6 9 Section 614(e) poses the difficult ques-
tion whether it is more in the moral and temporal interests of the child
to have a parent, although unfit, than to have a slender chance of
adoption but with the likelihood of having no parent at all. It is quite
possible that even without close contact with his parent, a child derives
emotional benefit from the knowledge that he has a parent and from
the occasional meetings he has with him. Also, it seems unfair to sever
permanently the ties between a parent and child when there remains a
possibility that they could eventually be reunited.170 Third, since the
purpose of the permanent termination statute is to free children for
adoption,171 termination might not be required where the parent has
shown himself unfit but where the chances are remote that the child
would be adopted if freed. On the other hand, the fact that a child is
not legally free for adoption may inhibit his placement.172 Therefore,
although termination may remove a child's only chance to have a
permanent home, failure to terminate could work the same result.
Second, children of minority-group parentage and children with physi-
cal or mental handicaps may not be so difficult to place in adoption
today as has traditionally been the case.173 To the extent that they are
adoptable it is obviously less in their interest to keep them tied to their
unfit natural parent. When to terminate the rights of the parent in
this situation is clear in principle. Because a court cannot condition an
order of termination on the subsequent adoption of the child,174 it
169 See discussion p. 259 infra.
170 Once permanent termination is ordered, it is highly improbable that the parent
could regain custody of his child even if the child were not subsequently adopted. Even in
proceedings to regain custody which has been temporarily removed in a neglect proceed-
ing, the parent is often held to such a high standard of fitness that recovery of the child
is difficult at best. Comment, The Custody Question and Child Neglect Rehearing, 85
U. CH. L. REv. 478 (1968). In the case of an order for permanent termination, which is
supposed to be permanent and to leave a parent no rights at all, it would seem impossible
for a parent to regain custody. Instead, the parent would have to establish new rights in
the child by seeking to adopt the now parentless child. However, his qualifications would
then be measured by the strict standards established by the child care agency for adoptive
parents generally, Since the parent has already shown himself to be unfit for a period of
at least one year, it is doubtful that the agency would approve the parent's application for
adoption.
171 GovERNoR's MESSAGE, APPROVING LAws OF 1959, N.Y. SEssioN LAws 1749 (Mc-
Kinney 1959).
172 See discussion pp. 218-219 supra.
173 See CMLD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AjqERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE 2 (1968);
MAts & ENGLER 353. It is uncertain, however, whether there has been a significant increase
in the number of adoptions of either type of child. Despite special efforts to place
minority-group children in adoptive homes, as of 1968 the percentage of minority-group
children adopted had not risen. ADOPTION IN 1968, at 1.
174 Section 614 speaks only of permanent termination. Moreover, to condition termina-
tion on subsequent adoption would present a number of difficulties. Both the child-care
agency and the parent would be uncertain about their rights and responsibilities. Also, the
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must examine carefully the likelihood that the child in question would,
in fact be adopted if he were freed from his natural parent. Where the
probability of adoption is significant, even if adoption is not available
immediately, termination should be ordered. In practice, where this
situation arises1 75 it will not be easy to ascertain the likelihood of adop-
tion and to balance this with the benefits of continued ties with the
natural parent. The court may have to rely in part on an evaluation by
the child-care agency.176 However, it is vital to the child that the court
exercise its responsibility as best it can, because the difference between
sound and faulty judgment can mean the difference to the child in
having or being denied a permanent home.
IV. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS BEFORE THE
CHILD ENTERS FOSTER CARE
The New York statute which dispenses with the requirement of
parental consent to an adoption for reasons such as abandonment also
dispenses with the consent requirement if the parent has been judicially
deprived of the child's custody by reason of neglect. 7 7 The propriety
parent, once severed from his child, might not want or be available to reacquire custody
and support responsibilities. LEGISLATIVE GumEs, at 13. Finally, an agency which had to
place a child by a certain date or see it lose its legal availability might be tempted to place
the child with adoptive parents who were not as fully qualified as parents that the agency
might find if it had a longer time to look.
175 The problem discussed here may be somewhat academic. Since the enactment of
the permanent termination statute there have been very few proceedings brought under it.
Family and Child, at 310. In the two reported cases where termination was ordered, the
child-care agencies submitted reports describing desirable adoptive homes that were
available. In re Jones, 59 Misc. 2d 69, 74, 297 N.Y.S.2d 675, 681 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County
1969). In re B., 60 Misc. 2d 662, 670, 303 N.YS.2d 438, 446 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
176 The court's reliance should be no more than partial. It is the court and not the
child-care agency that is to make the determination under section 614(e). Furthermore, the
agency may not always appreciate the adoptability of children in its care. See the discus-
sion pp. 256-258 infra.
177 N.Y. Dom. RE. LAw § 111 (McKinney Supp. 1970):
Sec. 111. Whose consent required [to an adoption]
The consent shall not be required of a parent who has abandoned the child
or who has surrendered the child to an authorized agency for the purpose of
adoption . . . or of a parent for whose child a guardian had been appointed
under the provisions of section three hundred eighty-four of the Social Services
Law or who has been deprived of civil rights or who has been divorced because
of his or her adultery or who is insane or who has been judicially declared
incompetent . . . or who has been adjudged to be an habitual drunkard or who
has been judicially deprived of the custody of the child on account of cruelty or
neglect, or pursuant to a judicial finding that the child is a permanently neglected
child as defined in section six hundred eleven of the Family Court Act . . .
[emphasis added].
Many other states have similar statutes, see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-1, 9.1-8
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967) ("substantial neglect... if continuous or repeated'); MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 210, § 3 (1969) ("wilfully... neglected to provide proper care and maintenance
... for one year last preceding the date of the petition').
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of the section 111 power seems dear.178 It is also clear that freeing a
foster-care child from his natural parent can be much easier under sec-
tion 111 than under the permanent neglect statute,179 even though the
latter was designed specifically to help free foster-care children. 8 0 Under
the adoption-without-consent statute the agency has no obligation to
try to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship. Likewise, it
is immaterial how much interest the parent may show in his child after
he loses custody. Finally, there is no statutory requirement that termina-
tion of the parent's rights be in the moral and temporal interests of
the child. Despite the liberality of section 111, it has received little use
in the past. This is largely because the statute provides no procedure
to bring the issue before a court prior to the time of the proceeding for
adoption. 8 ' Without such a prior proceeding, the child, not legally
free to be adopted, is unlikely to be placed in a pre-adoptive home, and
the issue of adoption without parental consent will never arise. 8 2
In the recent case of In re C., 183 the Family Court revived this
section 111 provision. However, it did not consider the petition for
adoption without consent as part of an adoption proceeding. Instead,
the court, well aware of the problems of the lack of a statutory pro-
cedure to bring the issue before a court at an earlier time' 84 and the
restrictiveness of the permanent neglect statute, 85 held that section 111
can be applied in the same initial proceeding in which custody is re-
moved because of the parent's neglect. In effect the court combined the
neglect statute with section 111 to terminate permanently the rights of
the parent. With parental rights severed, the child entered foster care
free from potential objection to his adoption, and the agency assuming
custody did not have to seek permanent termination of custody under
the permanent neglect statute.
Although the section 111 power to dispense with parental consent
is clear when used in an adoption proceeding,186 questions arise when
178 In re Connolly, 154 Misc. 672, 278 N.Y.S. 32 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1935). In re
Antonopulos, 171 App. Div. 659, 157 N.YS. 587 (2d Dep't 1916); In In re C., 63 Misc. 2d
1019, 1021, 314 N.Y.S.2d 255, 258 (Farn. Ct. N.Y. County 1970), the court said, "no judicial
doubt as to the power granted by section 111 has ever been expressed, so far as this Court
can discover."
170 This statute is reprinted note 92 supra.
180 The "Permanently Neglected" Child, at 2.
181 In re C., 63 Misc. 2d 1019, 1022, 314 N.Y.S.2d 255, 260 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
182 See pp. 222-223 supra.
183 63 Misc. 2d 1019, 314 N.Y.S.2d 255 (Faro. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
184 Id. at 1022, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
188 Id. at 1021, 314 N.YS.2d at 259.
186 See note 178 supra.
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it is used, as in In re C., in the same proceeding which determines the
facts necessary to dispense with consent. In the first place, it is likely
that the statute was intended to apply in adoption proceedings only.
Section III appears in Article 7 of the Domestic Relations Law which
specifies the procedural requirements for an adoption. Also, section 111
is entitled, "Whose consent required." Thus, it seems that the statute
was intended to receive application in those adoption proceedings in
which the question of parental consent arises. Additional support for
this position can be found in the statutory language. The words, "who
has been judicially deprived of the custody of the child," make more
sense if they are taken to refer to a prior determination of neglect than
a determination made almost simultaneously in the same proceeding. s7
In the second place, a procedure to dispense [in a neglect case] with
the requirement of parental consent to a conjectural adoption in the
future involves obvious dangers to parental rights. Neglect proceed-
ings can be instituted for many different reasons, not all of which are
free from ambiguity.181 To the extent that a determination of neglect
187 This argument does not require the petition to dispense with consent to be
determined in the adoption proceeding. The petition could as easily be determined in
a separate proceeding after the neglect determination but before the adoption proceeding.
The language merely seems to contemplate that the petition to dispense with consent is
determined in a proceeding subsequent to the neglect proceeding.
188 Neglect is defined by the N.Y. FA1. Or. Acr § 1012(f) (McKinney Supp. 1970) as
follows:
"Neglected child" means a child less than eighteen years of age
(i) whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is
in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his
parent or other person legally responsible for his care to exercise a minimum
degree of care
(A) in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education,
medical or surgical care, though financially able to do so or offered financial or
other reasonable means to do so; or
(B) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by un-
reasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or a substantial risk thereof,
including the infliction of excessive corporal punishment; or by using drug or
drugs; or by using alcoholic beverages to the extent that he loses self control of
his actions; or by any other acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of
the court; or
(ii) who has been abandoned by his parents or other person legally responsible
for his care.
In this recently revised statute, the words "impaired," "minimum degree of care,"
"adequate," and "similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court" will have to be
given specific content by judicial application. It may be noted, however, that this statute
is an obvious improvement over its predecessor, N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 312 (McKinney 1963),
which included the following provisions:
A "neglected child" means a male less than sixteen years of age or a female
less than eighteen years of age
(A) whose parent or other person legally responsible for his care does not ade-
quately supply the child with food, clothing, shelter, education, or medical or
surgical care, though financially able or offered financial means to do so; or
(B) who suffers or is likely to suffer serious harm from the improper guardian-
ship, including lack of moral supervision or guidance, of his parents or other
person legally responsible for his care and requires the aid of the court; or
(C) who has been abandoned or deserted by his parents or other person
legally responsible for his care.
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can support what is in effect an order of permanent termination, the
potential impact of these proceedings on parents increases enormously.
The In re C. court was not unaware of this problem. It held that the
combination neglect-section 111 procedure could be used only in "ex-
treme cases,"' 89 and that, in contrast to determinations made in adop-
tion proceedings, there must be a showing of "exigent circumstances
for dispensing with parental consent in addition to the bare statutory
condition" and the parent is entitled by due process to his "day in
court," with prior notice of the section 111 issue.190 Nevertheless, there
is reason to doubt that the New York appellate courts will consider
these additional requirements sufficient to protect the parent's rights
in his child. New York decisions have long emphasized the importance
of the rights of the natural parent. 191 Typically, courts speak of the
"primacy of parental rights"'9 2 and impose a high burden of proof on
the parties seeking to adopt the child.193 Where, as in In re C., there is
no prospective adoptive home at the time of the proceeding to termin-
ate the natural parent's rights, the courts may well find less reason to
approve of the proposed termination. 194
Another difficulty with the combination neglect-section 111 ter-
mination proceeding is presented by Part 6 of the Family Court Act.
Part 6 provides a procedure for new hearings and reconsiderations of
orders entered under section 1055 (formerly section 355), the provision
under which custody of children adjudicated to be neglected is trans-
ferred. In particular, the child's parent is authorized to petition to
terminate placement or to set aside, modify, or vacate any order made
under section 1055.195 The continuing right of a natural parent to
189 63 Misc. 2d at 1023, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
190 Id. at 1023, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 260-61. The court found both of these requirements
to be satisfied. The exigent circumstances were that it was "entirely improbable that the
respondent-mother will ever be able to provide stable and suitable care for the child
either personally or through a relative." Id. at 1024, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
191 See note 90 supra. See also In re Adoption of Anonymous, 60 Misc. 2d 854, 304
N.YS.2d 46 (Sur. Ct. Suffolk County 1969); cf. Tierney v. Flower, 32 App. Div. 2d 392, 302
N.Y.S.2d 640 (2d Dep't 1969); In re Jewish Child Care Association, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 183
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959). See also the discussion of the "Baby Lenore" case note 67 supra. But
see People ex rel. Stone v. Maglio, 62 Misc. 2d 292, 308 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County
1970); In re Wilkov, 33 App. Div. 2d 805, 307 N.Y.S.2d 31 (2d Dep't 1969).
192 See, e.g., People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 469, 113 N.E.2d 801, 804
(1953).
193 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Anonymous, 60 Misc. 2d 854, 304 N.Y.S2d 46 (Sur. Ct.
Suffolk County 1969).
194 It will be remembered that the issue of parental fitness is logically distinct from
the suitability of the adoptive home. See p. 229 supra. Yet it seems unrealistic to suppose
that a court will not be influenced by the fact that if termination is granted, the child
will lose his natural parent without being assured of obtaining adoptive parents.
195 N.Y. FAm. Cr. Aar §§ 1061, 1062 (McKinney Supp. 1970):
Sec. 1061. Staying, Modifying, Setting Aside or Vacating order
For good cause shown and after due notice, the court on its own motion, on
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contest the placement of his child - after he has been adjudicated
neglected -has also received strong judicial endorsement' 90 When
this parental right is placed against the neglect-section 111 proceeding,
it seems effectively to undercut it. The In re C. court combined sec-
tion 111 with the neglect determination in order to remove the child's
legal disability and thus free him for adoptive placement, but sections
1061 and 1062 give the parent a continuing legal power to obtain the
child's return. Again, the In re C. court wished to avoid the restrictions
of the permanent neglect statute including the lengthy period before
a petition for termination of parental rights can be brought, but under
sections 1061 and 1062 the parent's rights continue until the adoption.
It should be noted that section 1061 requires any modification of an
order to be based on "good cause shown" and thus restricts somewhat
the parent's power to seek the child's return. Nevertheless, the pro-
visions in Part 6 very much reduce the usefulness of a neglect-section
111 proceeding.
A final observation about the combination proceeding is that it
can receive application only in cases of involuntary foster-care place-
ments. 1 97 Whether or not section 111 could reach the case of a voluntary
placement, few parents would relinquish their children if they were
required also to relinquish any objection to the child's adoption. The
combination proceeding, then, even if viable, does not eliminate the
motion of the corporation counsel, county attorney or district attorney or on
motion of the petitioner, or on motion of the child or on his behalf, or on
motion of the parent or other person responsible for the child's care may stay
execution, of arrest, set aside, modify or vacate any order issued in the course of
a proceeding under this article.
Sec. 1062. Petition to Terminate Placement
Any interested person acting on behalf of a child placed under section one
thousand fifty-five, the child's parent, or the person legally responsible for the
child may petition the court for an order terminating the placement. The
petition must be verified and must show:
(a) that an application for the child's return to his home was made to an
appropriate person in the place in which the child was placed;
(b) that the application was denied or was not granted within thirty days
from the day application was made; and
(c) the grounds for the petition.
196 In In re Santos, 278 App. Div. 373, 376, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716, 718 (1st Dep't 1951), the
court said,
The order appealed from is . . . erroneous .... It confirmed the children's
commitment to the Free Synagogue Child Adoption Committee "no longer
without prejudice to the rights of the mother." We think the court should not
have entered the order with prejudice to any further application by the mother,
the natural parent of the children. She should not have been thus forever barred
from any opportunity whatever to apply in the future for custody no matter what
state of facts might be then disclosed.
197 The involuntary placement need not be made solely because of an adjudication
of neglect. A reading of section 111 will show many other circumstances in which
section 111 could be similarly applied when the child enters foster care or when an
order affecting the parent is made.
[Vol. 46:215
PERMANENT NEGLECT STATUTE
problem of the abandonment of children in long-term foster care.198
Instead, it provides a method of limited efficacy and scope to free for
adoption certain children who are involuntarily placed in foster care.
V. OTHER BARRIERS TO ADOPTION
Without a statute to facilitate the termination of rights of parents
who abandon their children in foster care, it is unlikely that many of
these children will be adopted. Yet the absence of such a statute is not
all that prevents their adoption. Rather, these children face a number of
obstacles in the community and within the child-care agency itself.
Moreover, the great number of children in long-term foster care are
there not just because of legal and social barriers to their adoption.
Adoptive placement is remedial rather than preventive. Children
usually are placed in foster care because of adverse family circum-
stances such as marital breakdown or parenthood outside of marriage. 199
Successful programs to improve and extend marriage counseling, to
decrease the rate of illegitimate births, and generally to improve the
living conditions and work opportunities in our society might well
reduce the number of children entering foster care in the first place.210
Furthermore, many children in foster care could return to a permanent
home with their own parents if social agencies were more successful in
their efforts to help these parents improve their lives and their relation-
ships with their children. However, given the present capacities of the
preventive and therapeutic social sciences, it might be more realistic
to try to focus social efforts on those children who do enter long-term
foster care and to try to place these children in adoptive homes.
Adoption is not always the goal for children in the care of author-
ized agencies. Besides those children who are unsuitable for mental or
emotional reasons, some children are not considered for adoption be-
cause, although they are suitable, foster care is thought to satisfy all
of their needs.201 If it is questionable that foster care can really satisfy
a child's needs as well as a permanent adoptive home, then perhaps it
198 Indeed, voluntary placements account for more than half of the foster-care
placements in the country. MADs & ENGLER 349.
1099d. 881. Maternal death in childbirth is another event which leads to foster
placement, Id.
200 Long-term foster care could not be eliminated entirely. Inevitably situations will
arise where parents become unable or unwilling to care for their child. Also, for certain
children with mental or physical handicaps, institutional or foster home care might help
them most. See note 26 supra. For a discussion of how to improve the care provided for
these children, see Madison & Schapiro, Permanent and Long-Term Foster Family Care
As a Planned Service, 49 CnsD WErxAAR 131 (1970).
201 In re Bonez, 48 Misc. 2d 900, 904, 266 N.Y.S.2d 756, 760 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County
1966).
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is the needs of the social worker that are satisfied by leaving the child
in foster care. It has been reported that social workers are "traditionally
reluctant" to go to court for fear that their petitions will be denied
and, consequently, their professional judgment rejected.2 0 2 Also, it is
not surprising to learn that social workers sometimes find the law un-
certain and confusing.203 Bureaucratic inertia plays an inevitable part
in agency operations, and children can disappear from sight and be
remembered only as a statistic. 204 Perhaps the most important deficiency
in the structure of responsibility of the agency for the child in its
care is the fact that the child-care agency has no objective incentive20 5
to place the child in an adoptive home.20 An obligation to seek
adoption can be implied from the fact that agencies are to act for the
best interests of the child.20 7 In New York it is possible to read the
permanent termination statute to include inferentially an obligation
on the part of the agency to reestablish a parental relationship or to
seek termination. 208 However, even the New York statute does not
explicitly require that in appropriate cases a proceeding for permanent
termination be brought.20 9 Furthermore, a statutory requirement to
seek termination and adoption, implied or expressed, would itself be of
202 Pennypacker, Reaching Decisions to Initiate Court Action to Free Children for
Adoption, 40 CHILI WE. FARE 11, 12 (Dec. 1961).
203 Id. at 15. The writer was referring to a provision of the Delaware statute which
provides for termination of parental rights when the parents "are not fitted to continue
to exercise parental rights." D.L. Co E ANN. tit. 13, § 1103 (West Supp. 1968). Although the
language of the New York statute is more concrete, in view of the decision in In re Clear,
58 Misc. 2d 699, 296 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1969), it cannot be considered a
model of clarity.
This difficulty can be remedied if the child-care agencies with the help of counsel
will compile a set of guidelines explaining circumstances under which permanent termina-
tion can be and ought to be sought.
204 Elements contributing to this inertia are "complications within foster care agencies,
staff shortages, too high caseloads, charter limitations, [and] lack of clarity in working
relationships between agencies, and in awareness of function . . ." WELFARE AND HEALTH
COUNCIL Or NEW YORK CITY, CHILDREN DnaR-vm OF ADOPTION 1-2 (1955).
205 The pride a social worker may take in his work is considered here more a sub-
jective than an objective incentive.
206 That the opposite may be the case was suggested in an article in the N.Y. Post,
Nov. 11, 1969, at 13, col. 1:
A Republican Assemblyman from Westchester has accused some adoption agencies
of blocking the adoption of foster children in order to keep their share of the
state funds allotted for foster care.
Assemblyman Joseph Pisani noted that of the $4200 allotted each foster child
annually by the state, only $1800 goes to the foster parents. The other $2400 is
kept by the adoption agency for clothing and medical expenses.
He said that agency expenses rarely amount to that much and that the
agencies are in effect pocketing the difference-while putting obstacles in the
path of would-be adoptive parents....
207E.g., N.Y. Soc. SFtvcEs LAW § 371 (McKinney 1966) as amended (McKinney Supp.
1970).
208 See the discussion p. 242 supra.
209 N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §§ 611, 614 (McKinney 1963).
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little value since there is no one to prompt or compel the agencies to
do so.210
Child-care agencies have been criticized for requiring unneces-
sarily strict and sometimes arbitrary qualifications of adoptive par-
ents.211 Age,212 psychological, 213 religious,214 fertility,215 income,216 and
racial217 standards have all been sharply questioned. One study sug-
gested that agencies also are too selective in choosing which children in
their care to place in adoption. It was found that more adoptive parents
seemed willing to accept children with mental or physical disabilities
than the number of these children placed with them.218 The study
hypothesized that "[c]onscious or unconscious attitudes on the part of
caseworkers may well serve as a barrier to the placement of such chil-
210 Family and Child, at 310. In In re Bonez, 48 Misc. 2d 900, 266 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Fam.
Ct. N.Y. County 1966), a New York court found a limited power to compel agency action
in sections 355(b), 355(c), 756(b) and 756(c) of the Family Court Act (McKinney 1963).
These sections provide that the placement of children away from their homes can be
extended only on regular judicial review. In the instant case the court refused to approve
extended placement and instead directed that a permanent home be sought for the child
in question.
211 See, e.g., MAAS & ENGLER 384; Isaac, Children Who Need Adoption, A Radical
View, 212 ATLANTic 45 (Nov. 1963) [hereinafter Isaac].
212 The following appeared in the N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1969, at 51, col. 2, under the
title, "Court Bars Adoption of Girl, 2, But Assails Foundling Hospital":
The State Supreme Court ruled yesterday that Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Marotta
could not adopt their 2/ 2-year-old former foster daughter, but severely criticized
the New York Foundling Hospital for taking the child away from the Marottas
last November and giving her to another couple for adoption.
The second couple, whose name was not disclosed, will be permitted now
to adopt the girl, whose name is Laura.
Judge Lester Holtzman based his decision on the finding of a court-appointed
child psychiatrist that a second move, back to the Marottas after nearly a year,
would do psychological damage to the child.
"The court cannot remove her again despite the injustice and heartbreak
to the petitioners," Judge Holtzman said in his decision.
Judge Holtzman praised both couples and said that the responsibility for
the case rested with the Foundling Hospital....
The Marottas ... took aura from the hospital as a foster child when she
was 5 days old. When they wanted to adopt her, however, the hospital declared
that they were too old, and removed her from their custody. Mr. Marotta is 50
and his wife "s 48.
Referring to the hospital in his decision, Judge Holtzman said: "Callously,
it aborts a child from her entire cosmos, the only home she has known for the
first two years of her life, not necessarily because it is in the best interest of the
child, but for the preservation of their power of ultimate determination." ...
Under the state and local laws governing adoption, the agencies that care for
abandoned children have a wide latitude in determining their future.
A new state law giving foster parents preference in the adoption of a child
they have taken care of for two years or more became effective last May 26.
However, it is not retroactive and so did not affect the Marottas' suit. ...
213 Isaac at 45.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 In re Bonez, 48 Misc. 2d 900, 266 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1966).
218 M.tWs & ENGLER 353.
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dren.''219 If this is true, then caseworker attitudes with respect to other
characteristics of the children - racial or religious characteristics -
might also impede adoption.
The potential impact on foster care children of restrictive agency
practices has increased as a result of two recent trends. Adoptions have
come to be more and more the responsibility of authorized agencies.
In contrast with independent placements - those arranged by private
parties like doctors and lawyers - the number and proportion of agency
placements have been continually increasing.220 The number of chil-
dren affected by agency practices has of course increased accordingly.
Second, in the last ten to fifteen years there has appeared a substantial
decline in the number of parents seeking to adopt children in propor-
tion to the number of children available.221 No longer are there ten
families applying for each child available. 222 Consequently, the accep-
tance by agencies of only ideally qualified couples is an unreasonable
luxury. To reject a couple seeking to adopt a child is too likely now to
eliminate a child's only chance to be adopted. Rather than passively
examining couples who apply to adopt a child and rejecting them for
minor shortcomings, agencies must now take the initiative and de-
liberately seek adoptive families with a wide range of characteristics. 223
Barriers to adoption are also found in the community. Because
many of the couples planning to adopt a child want to adopt someone
"like them," the child who is "different" suffers a serious disadvantage.
A minority group child, especially one whose physical appearance re-
veals his minority group background, invariably is slower to be
219 Id. 384.
220 CLARK, 603. In 1964, for example, agency placements accounted for almost two-
thirds of the 71,000 non-relative adoptions in the United States. AMERICAN AcaDmzy OF
PEDIATRICS, COMMrrrE ON ADOPTION, ADOPTION OF CHILDREN 2 (1967). (There were an
additional 63,000 adoptions by relatives in the arrangement of which agencies presumably
had a much smaller part.)
221 CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA 2; CLARK 604-05. The reaons for this change
are not dear. One author points to the rising birth rate of illegitimate children, which
would tend to increase the supply of children available for adoption, and medical de-
velopments to reduce the incidence of infertility, which would enable more parents to
have children of their own. CLARK 604-05. Another writer suggests that the increased
prominence of agencies with their unnecessarily strict requirements for adoptive parents
has discouraged many potential applicants. The reasons may well lie deeper, however,
and may be discoverable only by a thorough study. For example, it is possible that
people who once would have adopted children in addition to one or two of their own
are today more conscious of the financial costs of additional children and are less ready
to expand the size of their family.
222 Katz, Community Decision-Makers and the Promotion of Values in the Adoption
of Children, 38 SociAL. SERvicE REv. 26, 27 (1964). But see Supply of Adoptable White
Babies Shrinks, New York Times, July 18, 1971, at 38, col. 3; Black Market Babies: Couples
Pay Big Fee To Get Children Fast, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 14, 1971, at 1, col. 4.
223 CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AmERIcA at 3.
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placed, 224 even when he is a good looking, intelligent, and generally
attractive child.2 25 Similarly, a physical or mental handicap all too fre-
quently brands a child as out of the ordinary and therefore unacceptable
although he could bring much happiness to a couple who would adopt
him.220 Another barrier may lie in a lack of sufficient awareness of the
possibilities of adoption among many potential adoptive parents. It
has been suggested that an image of child-care agencies as a place filled
with faceless officials requiring endless formalities has prevented the
agencies' services from becoming known or trusted in the Negro com-
munity and among lower income groups.227 Mature couples who have
already raised children of their own might well be interested in adopt-
ing a child if they were apprised of the opportunities for adoption and
reminded of the satisfactions that raising a child can bring. Economic
problems, too, prevent adoption. It is hoped that the standard of living
of our society will soon be raised so that all couples can afford the
financial responsibilities of adopting a child. Until that time, a system
could be devised to subsidize couples who are otherwise qualified to be
adoptive parents.22 8 Several states have already started programs of this
sort although the subsidies are subject to a number of conditions.229
Subsidies are presently granted for foster care, and adoptive parents
should receive subsidies at least in the same amounts. Subsidies to
adoptive parents in larger amounts seem justified by the dear social
value of placing a child in a permanent home.
224 MAAS & ENGLER 353-55; AssxmcmN AcADEmy OF PEDIATRICS, COMITmITEE ON ADOP-
TION, ADOPnON oF CHILREN 57 (1967). As of 1968 the percentage of minority group
children placed in adoption had not risen despite special efforts invested by agencies.
ADOPTIONS IN 1968, at 1.
2 In re Bonez, 48 Misc. 2d 900, 266 N.YS.2d 756 (Faro. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
226 MAAs & ENGLER 353; A a5PCAN ACADmiY OF PmiArmcs, Commrrr ON ADOPTION,
ADOPTION oF CmLREN 57 (1967).
227 MLAS & ENGLER 584. But see Fowler, The Urban Middle-Class Negro and Adoption:
Two Series of Studies and Their Implications for Action, 45 CHILD WaLFAIm 522 (1966),
and Deasy 9- Quinn, The Urban Negro and the Adoption of Children, 41 Cmw WnL~mm
400 (1962), for the suggestion that the relatively small number of adoptions by Negro
couples is due more to low interest and motivation than alienation from agency services.
228 Goldberg & Linde, The Case for Subsidized Adoptions, 48 CHILD WELFARE 96
(1969); AimscAN ACADEiuY oF PEDIATRICS, CoWrrrx ON ADOPnON, ADOPTnON OF CHLDREN
57-58 (1967).
220 E.g., N.Y. Soc. SEavicEs LAw § 398 (McKinney Supp. 1968) (child must be adopted
by foster parents with whom he has lived for at least six months); MIcH. Com. LAwS ANN.
§ 710.13a (West Supp. 1970) (child must have been in foster care for not less than 4
months; support payments not to exceed $600 per year; payments for medical expenses
due to condition which existed prior to adoption); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 893.07 (West Supp.
1970) (child must not be "readily adoptable," must have been a ward of the commissioner
of public welfare, and must have resided in home of adoptive parents at least six
months prior to adoption).
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A large number of children in foster care today will neither return
to their homes nor find new, adoptive homes, because their parents
will not make the decision necessary for either to happen. Remaining
indefinitely in foster care and usually passing through at least two
placements, 230 these children will frequently miss the warmth and
attention that they want and need. Permitting this situation to con-
tinue imposes a double burden on society. Many children will grow up
without the emotional and psychological foundations necessary to be-
come happy and productive citizens. 231 Second and not without its
ironic overtones is the fact that society bears a great financial cost by
keeping these children in foster care.
A statute which would terminate the rights of a parent who is
unwilling to reassume responsibility for his child but who is also un-
willing to consent to the child's adoption would help a number of the
children in long-term foster care to be placed in adoptive homes. The
statutes which are available, however, do not easily accomplish this
result. Best interest and abandonment statutes are encumbered by a
thick gloss of restrictive constructions, and, 'because petitions under
them are usually brought as part of the adoption proceeding, the
statutes can lead to unfairness and confusion. Statutes speaking more
directly to indefinite foster placements and requiring a prior, separate
proceeding to determine whether to terminate the parent's rights are
more suitable to the task. But the analysis of the New York permanent
neglect statute shows that this type of statute, too, can be somewhat
confusing and restrictive. And the recent judicial attempt to circumvent
the New York statute seems questionable at best.
Unfortunately, no matter how well designed a statute is to free
appropriate foster care children for adoption, a number of children
still will not be placed because of obstructions in the child-care agency
and barriers in the community.232 Nor will these obstacles give way
unless a comprehensive social effort is mounted against them. At the
230 MAAS & ENGLE 350.
231 In In re Jones, 59 Misc. 2d 69, 72 n.4, 297 N.Y.S.2d 675, 679 n.5 (Fain. Ct. N.Y.
County 1969), the court observed that the respondent-mother, who was found to have
permanently neglected her child, was herself born out of wedlock, was "'boarded out' from
the age of 3 to adolescence .... [and] felt herself rejected by her mother throughout
her life." The court also noted that at the time of the proceeding the respondent, with
a two-year-old out of wedlock child, was being supported by public assistance and was
awaiting the birth of another out of wedlock child. Id. at 70 n.1, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 678 n.2.
232 This proposition is corroborated by the experience of New York where, since the
enactment of the permanent neglect statute, there have been far fewer proceedings to
terminate parental rights than supporters of the statute expected. Family and Child, at
310.
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same time society cannot afford to lose sight of its long term goal of
eliminating the conditions and circumstances that lead so many parents
to abandon their children in foster care.
The lawyer and the legislator cannot allow themselves to be de-
terred by the magnitude of the effort required to substitute permanent
homes for long-term foster care. It is their job to enact, apply, and
change the law, and until this is done other efforts will hardly be
productive. It would make little sense to encourage adoptions in the
agencies and the community if the children in foster care cannot be
freed for placement.
With several changes the New York permanent neglect statute
would become a clearer and more serviceable law. A revision of the stat-
ute like the following would meet the major criticisms voiced earlier in
this article. (Additions to the statute are written in italics; deletions are
enclosed in brackets.)
§ 611. Permanently neglected child
A "permanently neglected child is a person under eighteen
years of age who has been placed in the care of an authorized
agency, either in an institution or in a foster home, and whose
parent or custodian has failed for a period of more than one year,
or more than six months in the case of a person who was placed in
the care of an authorized agency before he was six months old,
following the placement or commitment of such child in the care
of an authorized agency substantially and continuously or repeat-
edly to maintain contact with and plan for the future of the child,
although [physically and] financially able to do so, notwithstanding
the agency's diligent efforts, of a nature and duration appropriate
to the circumstances of the case and consistent with the agency's re-
sponsibility for the welfare of the child in its care, to encourage and
strengthen the parental relationship. In the event that the parent
defaults after due notice of a proceeding to determine such neglect,
such physical and financial ability of such parent may be presumed
by the court.
§ 614. Originating proceeding permanently to terminate custody
A proceeding permanently to terminate the parent's or other
custodian's custody of a child is originated by a petition alleging:
(A) The child is a person under eighteen years of age;
(B) The child has been placed in the care of an authorized
agency, either in an institution or in a foster home;
(C) The authorized agency has made diligent efforts, of a
nature and duration appropriate to the circumstances of the case
and consistent with the agency's responsibility for the welfare of
the child in its care, to encourage and strengthen the parental re-
lationship and specifying the efforts made;
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(D) The parent or custodian, notwithstanding the agency's
efforts, has failed for a period of more than one year, or more than
six months in the case of a person who was placed in the care of an
authorized agency before he was six months old, following the
placement or commitment of such child in the care of an authorized
agency substantially and continuously or repeatedly to maintain
contact with an plan for the future of the child although [physically
and] financially able to do so; and
(E) The moral and temporal interests of the child require that
the parents' or other custodian's custody of the child be terminated
permanently.
The proposed amendments build on the analysis of the statute
in Section III. The major objection to the length of time which
the parent is given before his child can be found permanently
neglected was the possibility of harm to the very young child.233 It is
imperative for the child to have a warm and intimate maternal rela-
tionship, something that foster care might not be able to provide.
Furthermore, delays in the adoptive placement of the very young child
significantly reduce his chances of being adopted at all. The cut-off age
of six months, while somewhat arbitrary, is chosen so as to include only
those children who, if freed from their parents six months or so later,
will still be readily adoptable. In the case of children older than a year
or two, these two reasons to accelerate adoptive placement are not so
urgent, and they do not seem to justify shortening the period in which
the parent may show himself fit.
Justification for deleting the condition that the parent must be
physically able to maintain contact and plan for the child's future flows
directly from the discussion earlier.23 4 In cases of permanent physical
disability the value of the protection given the parent by failing to
terminate his rights is more than outweighed by the unfairness to the
child who by hypothesis will not receive adequate parental care. When
the disability is temporary, sufficient protection for the parent (and
child) can be found in section 614(e).
The second addition to the statute, modifying the requirement
of the agency's "diligent efforts," makes explicit what this article has
argued is already present implicitly.23 5 However, since the lack of
statutory clarity exposed in In re Clear236 almost resulted in the denial
of a petition for the termination of parental rights in a case which the
233 See pp. 219-220 supra.
234 See pp. 245-246 supra.
235 See pp. 237-238 supra.
236 58 Misc. 2d 699, 296 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Faro. Ct. N.Y. Count, 1969).
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statute was probably intended to cover,2 7 it is obviously preferable to
specify in the statute these limits to what is expected of the agency in
its efforts to strengthen the parental relationship.
Permanent termination statutes focus by necessity on the care the
parent gives to the child. Unless the parent is found unfit, his rights in
the child cannot be terminated. At the same time the statutes will not
be given their proper application until the rights and interests of the
child also receive due recognition. Alongside the rights of parents in
children should be recognized the rights of children in parents -
parents who will take them into a warm and supportive permanent
home.
237 Discussing the provision requiring the agency to make diligent efforts to strengthen
the parental relationship, one of the draftsmen of the statute said, "Given careful casework
and proper presentation of the facts to the court, there is no reason to suppose that this
requirement will obstruct termination of parental rights in appropriate cases." The
"Permanently Neglected" Child, at 3.
